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SAMENVATTING IN HET NEDERLANDS  
(DUTCH SUMMARY) 
De New Public Management (NPM) beweging, die technieken en instrumenten uit de private 
sector in overheidsdiensten introduceert, richt zich niet enkel tot de (top)ambtenaren maar 
focust ook expliciet op politici. Er wordt van hen verwacht dat ze efficiënt, kostenbewust en 
resultaatgericht besturen. Binnen- en buitenlandse ervaringen tonen echter aan dat de 
resultaten van dergelijke hervormingen niet altijd bevredigend zijn, vooral wat de politieke 
besluitvorming betreft. Zowel academici als praktijkmensen zijn over het algemeen eerder 
sceptisch wat betreft de impact van de hervormingen op het gedrag van politici.  
Dit doctoraat focust op één van de kernelementen van het NPM, m.n. het financieel 
management. Het omvat drie studies die vanuit diverse invalshoeken aspecten van financieel 
management door lokale politici bestuderen. 
De eerste studie maakt een evaluatie van de vertrouwdheid van fractieleiders in de 
gemeenteraad met een aantal NPM principes. Vertrouwdheid wordt aanzien als een eerste 
fase binnen de implementatie van nieuwe instrumenten en principes. De opzet is om met een 
vernieuwende methodiek die erin bestaat een „NPM-vertrouwdheidscoëfficiënt‟ te 
construeren een eerste kwantitatieve analyse van vertrouwdheid met NPM mogelijk te 
maken. Daarnaast behandelt de studie de controverse in de literatuur m.b.t. het effect van 
individuele kenmerken op deze NPM vertrouwdheid. De data werden verzameld via een 
online bevraging bij 363 fractieleiders in Vlaamse gemeenteraden. De resultaten tonen aan 
dat fractieleiders slechts in beperkte mate met de principes vertrouwd zijn, maar dat 
verschillende persoonlijke kenmerken hierop een invloed uitoefenen. Het behoren tot de 
meerderheid, verschillende mandaten combineren, financiële en politieke ervaring hebben 
een positieve invloed op vertrouwdheid met NPM concepten. 
Na vertrouwdheid met NPM principes onderzoekt de tweede studie een specifieke toepassing 
ervan in de praktijk. Het maakt een balans op van het gebruik van financiële informatie 
tijdens het budget debat in de gemeenteraad. Aangezien politici een gebruikerspatroon 
hebben dat afwijkt van het „klassiek of traditioneel‟ gebruik van financiële informatie, 
hanteert deze studie een innovatieve vorm van data verzameling en analyse. Het discours van 
raadsleden tijdens het budgetdebat wordt grondig geanalyseerd en voor elke tussenkomst 
wordt nagegaan of er financiële informatie in vervat zit. De analyses bieden voor de eerste 
maal empirisch bewijs over het zichtbaar gebruik van financiële informatie door raadsleden. 
We meten het aantal referenties naar financiële informatie (zowel budgettaire als 
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vermogensinformatie) op basis van een scoringstechniek uit de management accounting 
literatuur. Bovendien onderzoeken we of verschillende lokale politieke en financiële factoren 
een impact hebben op dat type gebruik van financiële informatie. De resultaten tonen aan dat 
budgettaire informatie veel frequenter in de discussie voorkomt dan vermogensinformatie. 
Factoren die een positieve invloed uitoefenen op het verwijzen naar financiële informatie zijn 
o.m. concurrentie tussen de partijen in de gemeenteraad, een meerderheid bestaande uit een 
coalitie van partijen, een mondelinge toelichting over het budget bij aanvang van de zitting en 
tenslotte de belastingvoet als indicator voor de financiële situatie van de gemeente. De 
schuldgraad en de figuur van de raadsvoorzitter (raadslid of lid van het college) hadden geen 
significante invloed. 
De derde en laatste studie focust op een ander aspect van lokaal financieel management. Het 
onderzoekt of lokale politieke omstandigheden de capaciteit van gemeenten om subsidies aan 
te trekken, kunnen verklaren. We gebruiken hiervoor gegevens uit een recente inventarisatie 
van de subsidiestromen naar lokale besturen in opdracht van de Vlabest (Vlaamse 
Adviesraad voor Bestuurszaken). In navolging van de „upper echelon‟ theorie, die stelt dat 
performantie van organisaties vaak afhangt van enkele centrale figuren, trachten we de 
„menselijke politieke factor‟ aan de kwantitatieve analyse van de politieke omstandigheden 
toe te voegen. Hiervoor interviewden we 11 burgemeesters, waarbij we vroegen naar hun rol 
in die subsidieprocessen en peilden naar hun mening over de impact van lokale politieke 
condities. De statische analyses wijzen uit dat sommige politieke omstandigheden (zoals o.a. 
het aantal partijen in de gemeenteraad) en bepaalde kenmerken van de burgemeester 
(politieke partij, cumul van politieke mandaten) een invloed uitoefenen op de hoeveelheid 
subsidies die een gemeente kan aantrekken. De burgemeesters geven aan subsidies zeer nauw 
op te volgen, maar de mate waarin ze zelf in het proces betrokken zijn, verschilt sterk.  
De algemene conclusie van het doctoraat luidt:  scepticisme met betrekking tot de resultaten 
van vernieuwingen op het handelen van politici is gerechtvaardigd, maar een aantal factoren 
kunnen ter zake een stimulerende of negatieve invloed uitoefenen. De nieuw ontwikkelde 
meetinstrumenten en de innovatieve methodologie bieden enkele vernieuwende inzichten die 
vooral de huidige opvattingen kunnen verfijnen. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This dissertation consists of three studies about local financial management. The articles 
have a different focus but they all address aspects of politicians‟ behavior or knowledge in 
relation to local financial management practices. The Flemish local governments‟ context is 
particularly conducive for this study as the Flemish local government Act “Gemeentedecreet” 
introduced new principles and instruments aiming at reforming and „modernizing‟ the 
administration and the (political) policymaking in cities and municipalities. This way, 
Flemish local governments represent an interesting case as „new‟ elements have been 
combined with existing ones.  
The first study addresses the controversy in the literature regarding the effects of individual 
factors on party group leaders‟ familiarity with a selection of New Public Management 
concepts. In doing so, it contributes to the scarce literature regarding this group of non-
executive politicians. Furthermore, this study has an innovative methodological approach, 
introducing an NPM “familiarity coefficient” in order to make a quantitative assessment. 
Data was gathered from a survey of 363 party group leaders in Flemish municipalities and 
the results reveal moderate familiarity. Factors that had a positive effect on the NPM 
familiarity coefficient were being a majority leader, combining different political mandates 
and financial as well as political expertise. 
The second study provides new empirical evidence about Flemish municipal councilors‟ use 
of financial information in the yearly budget debate. Since councilors generally do not handle 
information according to „standard use models‟, this article adopts a new method of data 
collection by scrutinizing their contributions during the budget debate in Flemish 
municipalities for the presence of financial information. The incorporation of financial 
information in councilors‟ contributions to the debate is conceptualized as a particular form 
of use of financial information in practice. The presence of both budgetary and accrual 
financial information is quantitatively assessed using a scoring technique taken from the 
management accounting literature. Additionally, this paper analyzes whether various 
political and financial circumstances affect politicians‟ mentioning of this information in 
their deliberations. The results reveal a strong prevalence of budgetary information over 
accrual accounting information in councilors‟ speech. This is positively influenced by political 
competition, the occurrence of a coalition majority, a verbal explanation of the budget and 
higher tax rates. Debt rate and the character of the council chair have no significant impact.  
The third and final study contributes to the need for more profound and integrated studies of  
individual and political characteristics that explain differences between municipalities with 
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regard to their capacities to attract subsidies1 . The paper quantitatively assesses the impact 
of local political conditions on municipalities‟ capacity to obtain subsidies. To integrate the 
„human political factor‟ we add mayors‟ opinions about their role and their view about the 
impact of local political conditions. We use empirical material from a recent inventory of 
subsidy flows by the Vlabest (Flemish advisory council for administrative affairs) in 
combination with data from interviews with 11 mayors. The statistical evidence suggests that 
some political factors (e.g., parties in council) and properties related to the mayor (party, 
combining political mandates) have an impact on the subsidy stream that municipalities 
obtain. Moreover, mayors position themselves as very relevant actors in the process of 
obtaining subsidies although their personal engagement differs. 
                                                        
1 Grants‟ is another frequently used term. We refer to both grants and subsidies in the same 
meaning. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
Managerial reforms of local government continue to dominate the political agenda and 
practice throughout Europe (Steyvers et al. 2008). In line with the principles of NPM (New 
Public Management) and post NPM, also called the “governance era”, cities and 
municipalities are constantly being restructured and reformed (Hood 1991, 1995, Bel, 
Hebdon, and Warner 2007, Kuhlmann 2010, Fattore, Dubois, and Lapenta 2012). These 
modernization initiatives do not solely affect the administration. Restructurings also concern 
political institutions and political decision- and policymaking (Hansen 2001). Many of these 
local governments reforms aim to make the political leaders much more market-, 
performance-, cost-, efficiency-, output- and audit- oriented (Diefenbach 2009, Bochel and 
Bochel 2010, Wollmann 2012). As a consequence, reformers undertook various initiatives to 
sensitize politicians for these reform ideas (Schedler 2003). They quickly understood that in 
order to successfully translate the reform principles into actual (political) practice, strong 
support and acceptance from politicians was necessary (Lapsley and Pallot 2000, Schedler 
2003, Anessi‐Pessina, Nasi, and Steccolini 2008, Bochel and Bochel 2010). They are 
considered as crucial actors to bring the modernization principles into practice. However, 
many experiences in Western local government showed that the results of those reforms on 
politicians‟ behavior are at least questionable and very often even disappointing (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2011). 
In combination with the efforts to „modernize‟ cities and municipalities, initiatives were taken 
to strengthen the position of local politicians in order to restore the position of the council as 
the cornerstone of local democracy (Rao and Berg 2005). With a view to re-empowering 
politicians, they were attributed more prominent roles in the policymaking and management 
of local governments. So local politicians are increasingly considered as key pivotal 
policymakers that should ideally decide more „businesslike‟ using specifically designed 
information and instruments.  
In spite of the omnipresence of local government modernization reforms, empirical evidence 
about the effects of those governmental reforms on politicians‟ actions and behavior remains 
a concern in contemporary research
1
. For example, there is far less knowledge about 
                                                        
1 There is of course some research that aimed at measuring (large scale) effects of NPM-reforms. For 
example studies in the area of performance management or public sector accounting see e.g.,  Pollitt 
and Dan (2013) and Speklé and Verbeeten (2014) 
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politicians‟ than about managers‟ experiences with NPM concepts and tools. Moreover, it is 
not evident that the findings concerning managers and civil servants apply to politicians as 
they conduct their work in very different ways (Askim 2008, Liguori, Sicilia, and Steccolini 
2009, Liguori, Sicilia, and Steccolini 2012). Although the findings about politicians‟ real and 
visible behavior are scarce, the majority of the existing studies are rather skeptical about the 
effects of many local government reforms on politicians‟ behavior. The major obstacle for 
politicians‟ assimilation of the NPM ideas seems to be the discrepancy between political 
thinking and the more efficiency driven businesslike thinking embedded in the NPM reform 
ideas and instruments. So the obvious question is, if all the initiatives aiming at altering 
politicians‟ decision-making by means of providing adequate NPM inspired instruments 
really lead to any desirable outcome.  
This field of tension between reformers‟ intentions to shift politicians‟ role orientation 
towards more „businesslike‟ thinking and politicians‟ ultimate behavior constitutes the 
research area of this doctoral dissertation. We particularly direct the focus to local politicians 
and financial management. Due to the closeness of local politicians to policymaking and 
implementation and the fact that they had to be willing to implement the NPM reforms from 
the ground up (in contrast with for example national politicians working at a certain distance 
from the implementation of new principles and instruments), these gaps between the 
intended and the actual impact on politicians‟ behavior are particularly visible at the local 
level. Local politicians are more operationally involved and face more directly the demands 
from their constituents. As a consequence their internalization of the NPM-mindset could be 
more amendable to systematic research.   
We conceptualize familiarity with NPM-instruments as an estimate of their integration of the 
NPM idea in their mindset. As such, we can roughly situate this dissertation in the third stage 
of Pollitt‟s classification of public management reform (Pollitt 2001). The first stage stands 
for the new managerial „discourse‟, the relatively abstract ideas of running the public sector in 
a businesslike manner forming the conceptual agenda. The second stage contains the 
decisions of political executives and managers to develop and adopt new instruments. The 
third phase concerns the daily managerial activities and styles that embed the newly 
developed management instruments (Pollitt 2001). Research concerning the third stage 
requires a more sophisticated approach than the first and the second. Often extensive field 
work, including survey and case or field studies will be necessary to investigate how 
techniques are used and also shed light on contextual and organizational factors that may 
influence the use of new techniques in actual practice (Van Helden 2005).  
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Most evidence about politicians‟ behavior in relation to NPM reforms stems from case studies 
using qualitative methods (for example Lapsley and Pallot (2000), Ter Bogt (2001), Van 
Helden and Jansen (2003)). These studies have provided valuable insight and interesting 
hypotheses but little systematic evidence (Askim 2007). In order to obtain more systematic 
empirical knowledge, this dissertation analyzes both qualitative and systematic quantitative 
data and employs innovative methods of data collection.  
Overall, the three studies in this dissertation contribute in various ways to the existing 
knowledge about local government reform and its impact on politicians. Firstly, we 
empirically investigate politicians‟ visible and more direct use of certain NPM related 
instruments based on rich and unbiased data about real and observable use of financial 
information in a political setting. Secondly, by studying both executive and non-executive 
politicians as distinctive categories. In addition, we assess party group leaders‟ familiarity 
with NPM principles and instruments, as special „in between‟ group.  Thirdly, all three studies 
cover different aspects of financial management, considered as the core of the NPM. The 
specific use of financial information for discussing the annual municipal budget, processes of 
obtaining financial grants and politicians‟ overall familiarity with budget ownership are, 
among others, subjects in this dissertation.    
Although the studies concentrate on particular topics, they also share common elements. In 
the two first studies politicians‟ familiarity with NPM related instruments and their 
observable use of financial information are considered indicators of their assimilation of this 
new mode of local government. Whereas the first paper assesses overall familiarity as first 
step in the process of internalization of NPM-like instruments and principles, the second 
paper focuses on the following stage, i.e., the observable use of related financial information. 
In the third paper local political conditions, in terms of political circumstances and the 
character of the mayor, are considered as explanatory factors for the extent to which 
municipalities are able to attract subsidies. So in contrast with the first two studies, the 
political context is more prominent in the third paper. Figure 1 presents the structure of the 
dissertation. 
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Figure 1: Structure of the dissertation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first study brings a general overview of party group leaders‟ familiarity with some of the 
most important NPM instruments and concepts. It introduces an NPM-familiarity coefficient 
to make a quantitative assessment of politicians‟ internalization of NPM ideas. In addition, 
some individual characteristics that could influence this familiarity are examined. The results 
show that besides the positive impact of political experience and financial expertise, political 
factors, more specifically belonging to the majority and combining political mandates, play a 
vital role in the extent to which politicians are familiar with instruments related to local 
governments‟ modernization. Majority members are more familiar with NPM instruments 
and principles than their opposition counterparts. 
After the more general evaluation of familiarity with modern policy instruments, the second 
study addresses the following stage, i.e., observable use of instruments and information. It 
zooms in on non-executive councilors‟ behavior, more particularly on their mentioning of 
 Local government reform: modernization + strengthening council 
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 translation into politicians‟ practice => stage 3 Pollitt‟s classification 
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financial information in the yearly budget debate in the municipal council and on the factors 
that could influence this particular type of use. In accordance with the first study, it confirms 
the relevance of political factors on politicians‟ actions. The political context (e.g., 
competition in the council) influences the extent to which financial information is referred to 
as argumentation in the budget debate.  
The third and final study directs the focus to processes of local financial management. It 
investigates whether local political conditions influence the level of subsidies that 
municipalities are able to obtain from the Flemish government. Additionally, some control 
factors that could also be considered as „demand indicators‟ are taken into account. The 
results show that larger and more urbanized municipalities obtain significantly more 
subsidies. However, statistical analyses also demonstrate a clear positive influence of some 
political conditions such as the number of parties. Municipalities with mayors from local 
parties are negatively predisposed.  
The three studies are presented as three consecutive chapters in this dissertation. They are 
followed by a conclusion, some points for practitioners and suggestions for future research. 
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STUDY 1 : WHY ARE SOME FLEMISH 
MUNICIPAL PARTY GROUP LEADERS MORE 
FAMILIAR WITH NPM PRINCIPLES THAN 
OTHERS? ASSESSING THE INFLUENCE OF  
INDIVIDUAL FACTORS3. 
Abstract 
 
This study addresses the controversy in the literature regarding the effects of individual 
factors on party group leaders‟ familiarity with a selection of New Public Management 
concepts. In doing so, it contributes to the scarce literature regarding this group of non-
executive politicians. Furthermore, this study has an innovative methodological approach, 
introducing an NPM “familiarity coefficient” in order to make a quantitative assessment. 
Data was gathered from a survey of 363 party group leaders in Flemish municipalities and 
the results reveal moderate familiarity. Factors that had a positive effect on the NPM 
familiarity coefficient were being a majority leader, dual mandate holding and financial as 
well as political expertise. 
Key words: local government reform, New Public Management, party group leaders. 
  
                                                        
3 A version of this paper has been published as Buylen, Bénédicte, and Johan Christiaens. 
“Why Are Some Flemish Municipal Party Group Leaders More Familiar with NPM Principles 
Than Others? Assessing the Influence of Individual Factors.” LEX LOCALIS-JOURNAL OF 
LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 12.1 (2014): 79–103. 
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1. Introduction  
New Public Management (NPM) not only seeks to reorganize administration, it also aims to 
make politicians much more business-like, i.e. market-, performance-, efficiency-, and output 
oriented (Hansen 2001, Tiili 2007, Diefenbach 2009, Pina, Torres, and Yetano 2009, Bochel 
and Bochel 2010, Wollmann 2012). Politicians are the key adopters of NPM related 
measures, although scholars are quite critical with regards to their absorption of its doctrines 
(Lapsley and Pallot 2000, Schedler 2003, Anessi‐Pessina, Nasi, and Steccolini 2008, 
Diefenbach 2009, Lowndes and Wilson 2003, Tiili 2007, Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). There 
are two primary reasons why it should come as no surprise that politicians experience 
difficulties in adhering to the NPM doctrine. Firstly, NPM takes economic rationality as its 
starting point, whereas politicians are generally constrained by a different rationale: the „logic 
of politics‟, which tends to centre on short-term thinking and obtaining re-election (Van 
Dooren 2005, Tiili 2007, Liguori, Sicilia, and Steccolini 2009). The two ways of thought come 
into conflict because NPM‟s „economic logic‟ does not correspond well with any „political 
logic‟ focused on attracting voters (Ter Bogt 2004, Yetano 2009, Liguori, Sicilia, and 
Steccolini 2009). Secondly, while NPM expects politicians to formulate strategic goals and 
oversee their implementation by civil servants, studies have shown that they have difficulty in 
developing targeted and coordinated action plans – despite the fact that politicians are now 
expected to have more business-related knowledge and qualifications (Steyvers et al. 2006, 
2010, Tiili 2007, Liguori 2010). 
While research has provided information regarding managers‟ experiences with NPM 
concepts and tools, it remains unclear as to exactly how much of the „NPM story‟ has been 
incorporated into politicians‟ mind-sets or which factors influence this internalization 
process (Schedler 2003, Askim 2007). In general, political scientists have preferred to study 
the evolution undergone by councilor‟s functions; for example, the comparative project on 
municipal assemblies in European local governance provides very valuable empirical 
information about career development, role reorientation and task environment in the light 
of contemporary local governance (Steyvers and Verhelst 2012a, b). However it does not 
relate councilors‟ role perceptions to actual familiarization with principles of modern local 
government.  
Relatedly, public management researchers only occasionally associate politicians with the 
results of these reforms, and local councilors have received especially short shrift. Studies 
such as those by Lapsley and Pallot (2000), Ter Bogt (2004), Melkers and Willoughby 
(2005), Askim (2007, 2008), and Van Helden and Ter Bogt (2011) have investigated 
politicians‟ use of specific NPM related financial instruments, such as accrual accounting, 
performance measurement and budgeting techniques. And while they have provided 
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investigators with valuable insights and interesting hypotheses about specific instruments 
and tools, there has been little produced in the way of more general, systematic, quantifiable 
data. Moreover, they only peripherally take into account individual factors, which could 
impact on politicians‟ familiarization with NPM concepts. Research on councilors‟ 
recruitment and career development did show that certain groups of politicians have a 
structural advantage over others and that social characteristics such as gender, education, age 
or profession have an effect on councilors‟ general professionalization and subsequent role 
conceptions, -style and focus (Steyvers and Verhelst 2012b). In fact, Askim‟s (2009) analysis 
of Norwegian councilors‟ use of performance information, shows that such factors can 
explain differences in usage patterns. Therefore, insight into the personal or individual traits 
that either aid or inhibit councilors in becoming familiar with NPM principles is very relevant 
to the success of future reforms. 
2. Focus on party group leaders in local councils 
The local level offers a particularly promising context for studying politicians‟ internalization 
of NPM principles. Councilors‟ close proximity to policymaking, and the fact that they have to 
implement NPM reforms from the ground up, makes this process readily discernable (Tiili 
2007). Furthermore, municipal politicians may have some discretion in instituting new 
guidelines, and could therefore be considered key political NPM protagonists and agents of 
change within their locales (Brugue and Valles 2005, Bochel and Bochel 2010). However, 
only a few studies have focused on, and systematically examined, the internalization of NPM 
concepts by non-executive councilors (Askim 2007, 2009). Because they are more clearly 
associated with NPM reforms, and the process by which they become familiar with 
modernization instruments is less opaque, studies often focus on mayors and aldermen, and 
as far as we could ascertain, no previous investigations have dealt with party group or faction 
leaders in councils as a separate and distinct class of politicians, although they form a unique 
sub-class among the „ordinary‟ councilors (Bochel and Bochel 2010).  
Party group leaders are elected councilors who lead others from their faction in the municipal 
assembly. Their standing is strong in countries where there is strong partisan fragmentation 
such as in the Low Countries. They hold a unique position as the linchpin between the 
legislative and executive levels, and means that strong-minded individuals can expand their 
roles if they so choose (Bochel and Bochel 2010). Majority group leaders, in particular, can 
often use their standing as a steppingstone to an executive mandate on the city council – and 
their close proximity to that body‟s members and the municipality‟s internal organization 
means that they could, in theory, be more familiar with the principles of modernization in 
local government than other councilors.  
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Conversely, this may apply to their colleagues on the other side of the aisle as well. The duty 
of the opposition is to check the other parties if and when it becomes necessary; as such, 
these faction leaders play a crucial part in supervising, critiquing and controlling the 
implementation of the majority‟s policies. As a result, they may pay particular attention to 
those NPM instruments associated with effective and efficient municipal organization. This 
study investigates to what extent this very prominent, yet thus overlooked, group of non-
executive politicians is familiar with NPM principles.  
3. Introducing the NPM familiarity coefficient 
Our primary purpose here is to perform a quantitative assessment. Despite having 
undergone more than two decades of NPM style reforms, we still lack a sound instrument for 
evaluating politicians‟ knowledge of these concepts (Windels and Christiaens 2006). With a 
view towards remedying this situation, we‟ve developed an „NPM familiarity coefficient‟ to 
measure how well policy makers are familiar with a selection of principles and instruments 
associated with NPM. Pollitt (2001) has outlined four states of NPM adoption: discourse, 
decision-making, real organizational practice and impact on public institutions. Our study, as 
outlined above, is situated in the third stage, real organizational practice.   
Indeed, in terms of what politicians are actually familiar with, the underlying theory may be 
less relevant than tangible principles and instruments. NPM is an umbrella term for a variety 
of different modernization initiatives with national and context specific features, and a 
councilor may not even realize that he or she is working within this framework when, for 
example, reading financial reports. We therefore believe that by assessing politicians‟ 
familiarity through actual instruments and principles, rather than theories, we will be able to 
draw some conclusions regarding how well NPM ideas have filtered into politicians‟ thinking. 
This has practical implications because other research has already shown that politicians who 
have more than a nodding acquaintance with NPM instruments are more likely to be 
convinced of their usefulness, and may therefore be more inclined to put them to the test 
(Anessi‐Pessina, Nasi, and Steccolini 2008). Being able to measure their familiarity will 
enable policy makers to target those groups that need to be more sensitized, thus improving 
reform implementation.  
4. Construction of the NPM familiarity coefficient 
The NPM-like instruments used in our study were chosen based on the stipulations of the 
Flemish Local Government‟s Act (LGA), the related explanatory memorandum and 
interviews with experts12. While the instruments under consideration were developed in 
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Flemish municipalities (see below), the underlying concepts are generic, and represent the 
NPM style of local government modernization as it has been applied in various European 
countries (Hood 1991, 1995). Gruening (1998) and Diefenbach (2009), both critics of the 
movement, consider them core concepts, undisputedly characteristic of NPM. The first three 
elements relate to internally oriented accounting tools, reflecting the fact that financial 
management reforms are NPM‟s bread and butter, and without them the theory would be far 
less significant (Guthrie, Olson, and Humphrey 1998). The fourth and fifth components refer 
to more general, externally oriented management principles.  
4.1 Budget ownership 
The devolvement, decentralization or delegation of budgets is a key item in NPM financial 
management (Guthrie, Olson, and Humphrey 1998). Budget ownership is an expression of 
visible, hands-on administration and contract control, bringing both increased discretionary 
power and clearer allocation of responsibilities (Hood 1991, 1995). It also articulates NPM‟s 
insistence upon the separation of politics and administration, which is intended to enhance 
civil servants‟ management freedom by increasing internal autonomization (Gruening 1998). 
According to Diefenbach (2009), empowerment and, at the same time, staff subsidiarity are 
expected to foster business-like, entrepreneurial attitudes, and could also speed up decision-
making processes. 
4.2 Management control and policy cycle 
New management control and policy cycles introduce improved financial reporting and 
administration systems in accordance with professional, private sector accounting norms and 
standards - such as the use of accrual based financial statements (Hood 1991, 1995, Guthrie, 
Olson, and Humphrey 1998, Gruening 1998). The Flemish version of this concept, the „BBC- 
Beleids- en Beheerscyclus
3’, integrates financial and management accounting systems by 
linking the budget to the reporting of results in financial and non-financial terms. This 
initiative also symbolizes a shift in the focus of management systems from inputs and 
processes to outputs and outcomes (Pollitt 2001).  
4.3 Internal control 
The third principle relates to the creation of internal and external public sector audits (Hood 
1991, 1995, Guthrie, Olson, and Humphrey 1998, Pollitt 2001). In order to hold politicians 
and managers accountable for their results, adequate internal control systems are necessary 
to monitor their activities and to review the efficiency and effectiveness of the delivered 
services (Guthrie, Olson, and Humphrey 1998, Gruening 1998). Stressing results rather than 
procedures, making clear statements regarding goals and taking a hard look at the objectives, 
all underlay these new internal control systems.  
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4.4 Municipal management team 
The municipal management team represents the establishment of a management culture that 
emphasizes private sector styles of administrative practice (Hood 1991, 1995, Diefenbach 
2009). Accordingly, management is treated as a separate and distinct organizational 
function, necessitating the creation of new managerial posts (Diefenbach 2009). This is all 
part of NPM‟s promotion of commercially minded, market-oriented management practices in 
which managers are given both the space and authority to carry out their work (Guthrie, 
Olson, and Humphrey 1998, Gruening 1998). 
4.5 Autonomization  
The fifth principle refers to the NPM preference for more specialized, „lean‟, „flat‟ and 
autonomous organizational forms rather than large, multi-purpose, hierarchical 
bureaucracies (Pollitt 2001). Autonomization is typified by the creation of distinct, quasi-
autonomous departments centered on the delivery of specific products or services, which, 
when applied to the public sector, disaggregates massive government organizations into 
separate units (Hood 1991, 1995, Gruening 1998). This decentralization into distinct, 
autonomous municipal entities is supposed to lessen hierarchy by creating more flexible 
structures and generating faster decision-making (Gruening 1998).  
5. Individual factors at play 
To identify relevant individual characteristics, we applied March and Olson‟s (1984, 2006) 
framework of „constitutions‟, „interests‟ and „powers‟, alongside the results of previous specific 
NPM related studies and political research. Within the context of our study, the constitution 
is largely normative, homogeneous and constant, as determined by the Flemish LGA, which 
leaves „interests‟ and „powers‟ to be accounted for. Individuals are empowered and 
constrained in different ways by various factors, which, in theory, should make them more or 
less likely to incorporate NPM principles and tools. We‟ve chosen to focus on five factors, the 
influence of which is heavily debated in the literature: experience, formal political role, 
ideology, financial expertise, and combination of political mandates. Figure 1 illustrates how 
these neo-institutional principles are incorporated into our research design. 
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Figure 1: Research design 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The effect of our first factor, political experience, on NPM familiarization is disputed. Some 
argue that highly experienced politicians are better able to interpret data and make use of 
new instruments because they find it easier to grasp novel information (Askim 2009). 
Seasoned politicians also tend to focus on their supervisory and policy making roles, and it is 
generally expected that they will make more comprehensive use of NPM instruments in 
carrying out these tasks (Reynaert, Steyvers, and Verhelst 2010). However, an established 
politician could see such innovations as a threat to his hard-won position (Steyvers, Reynaert, 
and Block 2010). Melkers and Willoughby (2005), as well as Askim (2009), found that when 
it came to the collection and application of performance information, use actually decreased 
with experience. In other words, political novices were more receptive to modernization than 
the veterans. De Groot et al. (2010) confirm this apparent contradiction: the less experienced 
are more open-minded, while the long serving rely on routine. As Askim (2009) has done, 
we‟ve used age here as a control in order to ensure that any results actually derive from 
political, rather than general, experience.  
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A subject‟s formal political role is the second factor that may influence NPM receptivity. 
Membership in the majority or opposition affects council function and political identity; 
however, it is still unclear which group is favored here. Majority group leaders have more 
access to inside information because they are better connected at the executive level (Ezzamel 
et al. 2005, Askim 2009).Their close proximity to the mayor and aldermen could make them 
more informed regarding NPM related managerial principles. However, majority group 
leaders tend to focus more on policy-making, and its defense, and less on control – which is 
mainly the task of the opposition (Verhelst, Reynaert, and Steyvers 2011). It could also be 
that as a result of party discipline, majority group leaders will be less inclined to be critical. 
According to this line of reasoning, their opposites should have greater familiarity with NPM 
concepts because they are more focused on controlling the efficient and effective organization 
of the municipality. Indeed, the first comprehensive evaluation of the Flemish LGA revealed 
significant differences between the two sides, with opposition members making more use of 
new instruments (Olislagers, Ackaert, and De Rynck 2009).  
The third controversial factor is ideology. Traditionally, left-wing parties are associated with 
bigger government and a less business-like attitude, as opposed to right-wing parties that 
advocate for greater economic efficiency and smaller government. However, early on in the 
movement, Hood (1991) rejected ideology as an explanation for macro-level reforms, and a 
meta-analysis of this factor‟s role in privatization, an NPM principle, has provided little 
evidence that right-wing governments are the driving force behind such policies (Bel, 
Hebdon, and Warner 2007). Nevertheless, the impact of ideology on local councilors is more 
uncertain. European parties recruit candidates from their social layers; for example, civil 
servants are more common among the leftist social-democrats, while the self-employed and 
those with business backgrounds are more prominent on the right (Reynaert 2012). However, 
it is not always the case that individual councilors, particularly on the left, are entirely 
committed to their party‟s ideology (Verhelst and Kerrouche 2012, Steyvers and Verhelst 
2012b). What we wish to discover is whether a link can be made with the right‟s tendency to 
attract business-oriented professionals and greater familiarity with NPM on the part of these 
councilors.  
Our fourth variable tests whether the professional use of financial information has a positive 
effect on NPM familiarity. According to the movement‟s quantitatively driven measurement 
logic, politicians should be able to competently interpret financial information and either 
challenge it or act accordingly (Guthrie, Olson, and Humphrey 1999). The regular usage of 
financial information in a professional setting may also suggest that these subjects have a 
more business-like attitude and a certain predisposition towards the use of management and 
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monitoring instruments, and we therefore expect to find that it does have an impact on 
familiarity with NPM principles. 
We further postulate that a combination of different political mandates, our fifth factor, may 
enhance our subjects‟ familiarity with NPM concepts. Candidates are standing for election 
more often and they increasingly hold more than one political position at the same time 
(Weekers et al. 2007). This cumul des mandats entails some advantages: politicians with 
concurrent mandates may be better informed due to their broader network and – it is 
assumed - better able to interpret unfamiliar information or work with new instruments 
(Askim 2008, 2009). Furthermore, because other governmental levels are also subject to 
NPM style reforms, they might already have firsthand knowledge of the relevant tools; 
although, this could also have a negative effect if these politicians are confronted by either a 
failure in NPM instruments, or a lack of interest in reforms. Furthermore, while this study 
explicitly focuses on non-executives, we have included majority group leaders who combine 
their council position with a local executive mandate either as a mayor or an alderman 
because of their leadership role and the relevancy of their political network to our analysis
4
.  
In addition, other variables have been taken into consideration under the broad heading of 
career development factors. Firstly, the gap between males and females in terms of political 
engagement is well established in the literature, but gender may also affect how people relate 
to politics in general. According to Hofstede (1998), masculinity is associated with ego and 
goal centeredness, performance, competitiveness, efficiency, an emphasis on visible 
achievements and material success. Femininity is associated with social goals, consensus 
seeking, an emphasis on equality, negotiation, social interaction and consensus building 
(Hofstede 1998, Fox and Schuhmann 1999). Although these findings concern national 
cultures while our study focuses on individuals, they do suggest that men should be more in 
favor of NPM than women. At the local level, Steyvers and Verhelst (2012b) found male 
councilors to be less engaged with “outward looking tasks”, while Steyvers et al. (2010) argue 
that female city managers are more open to modernization and innovation as a result of their 
preference for communal decision-making. Thus it is not clear whether gender could have an 
impact on an individual‟s internalization of NPM tools and principles.  
Secondly, existing research also differs regarding the role played by education (Askim 2009). 
People with advanced degrees and training are supposed to handle formal, numerical or 
technical information more easily, and economic education stimulates financial, analytical 
and strategic skills, which are very relevant to NPM internalization. Party group leaders with 
a formal background in economics may be better able to recognize the advantages of 
business-like instruments and tools, and thus be more likely to use them. Reynaert et al. 
(2010) found that highly educated councilors focused more on policy and control – aspects 
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associated with NPM. This was confirmed in the preliminary evaluation of the Flemish LGA 
conducted by Olislagers et al. (2009); those with more education used significantly more of 
the new instruments. However, Askim (2009) found that the highest educated were the least 
inclined to use performance information. It is possible that those with an economic education 
geared towards the private sector could then become disillusioned by the poor application of 
NPM principles within the public sector, making them less inclined to use its associated 
instruments while in office. It is simply not clear at this point what impact, if any, education 
may have on either implementation or familiarity.  
Thirdly, profession could have a part to play here as well. Self-employed individuals have, at 
least in theory, more business-like attitudes and approaches to handing problems, possibly 
making them more inclined towards NPM, along with other types of professionals – bankers 
and CEO‟s, for example. Furthermore, party group leaders who essentially work full time as 
politicians, with cabinet positions or a combination of mandates, are generally expected to be 
more in favor of the prevailing governmental reforms and thus more knowledgeable of the 
NPM concepts upon which they are based. Furthermore, as discussed above, there is a link 
between ideology and profession, in that right-wing parties do recruit candidates from more 
economically oriented environments (Reynaert 2012). 
Finally, we‟ve also included an organizational dimension. Party group leaders‟ familiarity 
coefficient could also depend on the institutional context in which they work. Polity size 
seems a good indicator of an array of structural characteristics (Askim 2009, Steyvers and 
Verhelst 2012b). A larger municipality implies more service users, more activities, more 
employees, more professionalization in the recruitment of councilors and possibly more 
interest in NPM implementation (Reynaert 2012). Certainly, the smaller the polity, the lower 
the average use of NPM instruments (helden and Jansen 2003). Table 1 in the appendix 
provides an overview of all the factors included in our analysis.  
6. Flemish municipalities 
The Flemish context is particularly conducive for studying party group leaders‟ familiarity 
with NPM. In 2002, authority over local entities was regionalized, and as a consequence the 
Flemish region now has its own LGA. The Flemish 2006 LGA (or Gemeentedecreet) is the 
most innovative one. The reform introduced new policy instruments with regards to financial 
management, control, audit, human resources and result oriented policy planning and 
evaluation (Windels and Christiaens 2006). In that sense, the LGA propagates NPM‟s tenet 
that politicians should act in a logical and rational fashion. Furthermore, because most of the 
changes are mandatory, the context for local council party group leaders is largely 
homogeneous. Flemish municipalities share common political and institutional systems, 
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employ similar budgetary processes and have identical electoral rules. However, while the 
formal requirements for most new instruments are equivalent in every municipality, this does 
not mean that their actual implementation will be identical for each party group leader.  
The Flemish region counts 7.464 local councilors divided across 308 municipalities. The 
municipal council has a threefold structure with an advisory board, an executive board and a 
mayor, and has between 7 and 55 members. While most Flemish councilors have day jobs 
and are only involved in politics part-time, multiple office holding is a frequent occurrence
5
.  
7. Data collection  
7.1 Instrument 
In order to measure party group leaders‟ familiarity with the aforementioned instruments 
and principles attributed to NPM, they were presented with a brief, online questionnaire. 
Respondents were asked to rate their familiarity with these concepts using a five-point scale 
varying from one (not very familiar) to five (quite familiar)6. The questions were formulated 
as follows: „to what extent are you familiar with the principle of (e.g.,) budget ownership in 
cities and municipalities?‟ In addition, biographical data about the individual factors under 
consideration was collected from each respondent.  
Many researchers have written about the trade-off between response rates and the number of 
questions asked (Julnes and Holzer 2002). Although this meant that not every dimension of 
NPM familiarity among our subject pool could be explored, we opted for single-item 
measurement, thereby minimizing non-responses. Nevertheless, the data collected 
sufficiently represent the factors identified in the literature. Still, one of the main limitations 
of survey research remains the self-reported nature of the information (Ter Bogt 2004, Askim 
2007, 2009). Various precautions were taken to enhance the data‟s validity. For instance, 
queries were clearly formulated and referred to identifiable and applied concepts. 
Furthermore, in order to avoid any possible confusion in the questionnaire, the questions 
were pretested with field experts and councilors not participating in the study.  
7.2 Sample 
We selected 123 councils by stratified random sampling in order to cover the width and 
breadth of Flanders.
 7
 Between December 2011 and February 2012 all party group leaders (N 
539) in those councils were contacted. After one round of follow-up, we obtained 363 
complete responses, giving us a response rate of 68%, with a mean of 2.95 party group 
leaders per council. We did not detect traces of self-selection or non-response bias in our 
sample – there were no significant differences found between late and early respondents8 
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They all fit the so-called „3M‟ profile of councilors: male, middle-aged and middle class 
(Reynaert 2012). Our average subject was approximately 50 years old, and a two-term 
councilor. Respondents came from a variety of parties and majority and opposition were 
almost equally represented.  
8. Results  
8.1 Party group leaders’ NPM familiarity coefficient 
Our NPM familiarity coefficient is comprised of party group leaders‟ ratings of their 
familiarization with the aforementioned five concepts. Each item in the coefficient was given 
equal weight because there is no documentation indicating that any has more effect than 
another. Furthermore, although they measure quite different concepts, statistical testing 
using principal component analysis shows that no item should be eliminated, and together 
they explain 52,6% of the variance9. Finally, our coefficient has a Cronbach‟s alpha value of 
0.77, which demonstrates its internal consistency. We therefore have firm evidence that all 
five concepts can be combined into one coefficient without differentiation.  
Table 4 in the appendix presents the details of our subjects‟ responses for each component, 
which did not differ significantly across the political spectrum
10
. On average, party group 
leaders of all stripes tended to evaluate their general knowledge of NPM as „neither good nor 
bad‟ (value three). At the same time, all five concepts were assessed differently, with party 
group leaders indicating more familiarity with the high profile, general management 
principles, than the rather opaque financial management instruments.  
In fact, only the difference between autonomization and management team concepts was 
non-significant
11
. These findings are somewhat less optimistic than those from the first 
evaluation of the LGA in Flanders, in which 62% of the councilors said they attached „a lot‟ or 
„a great deal‟ of importance to the report by the municipal secretary regarding internal 
controls. The same held true for budget ownership, to which the 56% of the subjects attached 
„a lot‟ or a „great deal‟ of importance (Olislagers, Ackaert, and De Rynck 2009). However, as 
discussed above, that study did not address party group leaders in particular and was 
conducted shortly after the LGA‟s establishment. 
8.2 The impact of individual factors 
Given the normal distribution of the index, OLS regression is applied to consider the effect of 
all variables under study together
12
. The results can be found in Table 2, which contains the 
standardized regression coefficients and their associated level of significance
13
. None of the 
independent variables under study poses problems of multicollinearity. Finally, the overall 
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explanatory value of the model is expressed by R². Descriptive statistics for all variables are 
presented in Table 3 in the appendix. 
Table 2: Regression results 
Dependent variable: NPM Familiarity coefficient N= 297  
Anova (F. 2.27, p. 0.014)   
 R² = 0.074   Adj. R²= 0.041   
Experience 0.114* (1.714) 
Formal political role 0.123** (2.074) 
Ideology 0.039 (0.641) 
Financial expertise 0.144** (2.424) 
Combination mandates 0.119** (2.019) 
Economic education 0.021 (0.349) 
Gender -0.034 (-0.563) 
Profession -0.052 (-0.859) 
Age -0.023 (-0.331) 
Polity Size  0.007 (0.119) 
T values OLS in parentheses    * 10%, **5% significance  
Maximum VIF: 1.44, Spearman Correlations: max. 0.24 between financial 
expertise and economic education, and 0.42 between age and experience.  
Because of the very limited correlations and associations between the 
independent variables, no interactions were integrated into the model. 
 
As shown in Table 2, our analysis reveals that experience has a clear and  positive influence 
on our subjects‟ familiarity with NPM. The longer party group leaders are members of the 
council, the more knowledge they come to have of NPM concepts. This confirms the thesis 
that experience facilitates assimilation of new management principles; demonstrating that 
political activities such as working in the council and frequently attending its‟ meetings 
provides party group leaders with the opportunity to familiarize themselves with these new 
concepts. Their experience allows them to compare old instruments with new NPM-style 
tools and to recognize the latter‟s advantage. Furthermore, by measuring age we were also 
able to isolate political experience from general experience.  
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As expected, formal political position also has a determinative effect on our subjects‟ 
familiarity with NPM. Majority leaders in Flemish municipal councils have a significantly 
better grasp of the concepts under consideration than do opposition leaders. This finding 
indirectly supports Askim‟s (2009) thesis that executive politicians use NPM driven 
performance information more than backbenchers. In the context of our study, it implies that 
majority leaders have a structural advantage over opposition leaders; namely, the supremacy 
of the executive college, which indirectly empowers them (Reynaert, Steyvers, and Verhelst 
2010). Connections at the top allow them to gain inside information and become more 
involved with the NPM style initiatives to achieve more efficient and effective service delivery 
in the municipality. Finally, the majority‟s focus on policy making may contribute to their 
particular interest in instruments and tools for modern local management. 
The hypothesis that financial expertise would enhance NPM familiarity has also proven well 
founded. Party group leaders who handle financial information in their professions are better 
positioned to absorb information on business-like concepts and this facilitates their 
acceptance of managerial instruments and tools. However, we must exercise caution in 
interpreting these results: the survey registered the use of any type of financial information, 
without focusing on specific accounting or financial management tools related to NPM – 
meaning that our definition of expertise in this instance is perhaps too broad.  
As expected, party group leaders who combine their local mandate with other political 
functions also have more familiarity with the business-like concepts and tools used in 
Flemish municipalities, likely because of the increased chance that they can pick up 
information on NPM concepts through their positions in other assemblies. Furthermore, they 
are better able to devote themselves completely to their political work, which may make them 
more professionally involved in managing governmental institutions.  
Ideology was the only primary variable that had no apparent impact – this is relevant because 
the effect that this factor could have on NPM implementation has been debated from the very 
start of the reform movement (Hood 1991). Our results show that ideology is not significant; 
there was no measurable difference between left and right wing party group leaders in terms 
of their responses or NPM familiarity coefficients.  
As regards the other career development variables, other researchers have already made 
arguments casting doubt on the impact of education. However, the lack of significant results 
in our study could also be explained by the measurement of this factor. Respondents were 
only asked if they received any kind of formal instruction in economics, without specifying 
the educational level. This means that everything from secondary school and practical 
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workshops to advanced academic degrees was included in the analysis. A more targeted 
approach may have delivered other results.  
Concerning professional activities, gender and polity size, there were no noticeable effects. 
While financial expertise has a positive impact on party group leaders‟ knowledge of NPM, it 
seems that the actual job content, and not the profession itself, are decisive in this context. 
Gender, heavily debated in the literature, had no impact whatsoever. Our results show no 
significant difference between male and female party group leaders. Nor did the only 
organizational variable, polity size measured by population, have any significant impact on 
subjects‟ NPM familiarity. 
Finally, we must stipulate that while our analysis explains some variance in party group 
leaders‟ familiarity with NPM concepts, much remains to be accounted for. The explanatory 
value of these individual characteristics is low overall, but our decision not to attempt to 
explain as much variation as possible could be considered a sensible limitation, rather than a 
shortcoming. Our aim was to assess the impact of a few specific, factors that have been 
debated in the literature - not to uncover all of the possible determinants of party group 
leaders‟ NPM familiarity. Comparable R² values are found in similar survey based research; it 
merely adds to the evidence that other formal, regulatory and constitutive factors play a 
greater part (see e.g., Steyvers and Verhelst (2012b). Other explanations could be the limited 
variability in the dependent variable, which only had values ranging between 5 and 25, and 
the fact that we studied a group of party group leaders who achieved a certain position 
through what could be considered a homogenizing process. So the difference in their NPM 
familiarity might not be very pronounced 
14
. Elements (outside the scope of this study) that 
could increase the explained variance can be found in the administrative and organizational 
processes (documentation from civil servants to politicians), the professionalization of 
supporting staff and the training provided by the political parties.    
9. Conclusion and discussion 
This study stressed the importance of individuals in modernization by focusing on party 
group leaders, an undervalued but very prominent group among non-executive local 
politicians. Our new NPM familiarity coefficient indicates very moderate familiarization on 
the part of our subjects, which corroborates the rather jaundiced findings from other 
research into politicians‟ use of specific NPM related instruments (Ter Bogt 2004, Tiili 2007). 
However, party group leaders are significantly more familiar with the distinctly external 
managerial principles, probably as a result of their visibility.  
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A possible explanation for this rather disappointing outcome could be that, even though these 
NPM based changes were put in place five years ago, it may require a lengthier amount of 
time for party group leaders to recognize the concepts‟ usefulness and internalize them. 
However, this is not terribly plausible in light of other research. A longitudinal analysis 
concerning the establishment of NPM associated accounting reforms in municipalities 
conducted by Christiaens and Van Peteghem (2007) showed no evidence of a significant 
increase in learning over time; to the contrary, after nearly five years, there were recurrent 
problems in implementing the reforms.  
No, the key issue remains whether party group leaders are intrinsically motivated to become 
familiar with NPM principles – not whether they have sufficient time in which to do so. Yet 
the gap between NPM-like thinking and political logic seems too large to overcome and we 
must ask ourselves whether politicians can truly incorporate the NPM-style into their work. 
Politicians represent the plurality of opinions and interests in society (Hansen 2001). Once in 
office, their role is to consider issues from different points of view, compromise between 
conflicting interests and judge what is most reasonable and appropriate in a given situation 
(Hansen 2001, Tiili 2007) – which is not necessarily what is efficient or economical. 
Moreover, NPM strongly advocates for setting goals, which explains why it does not easily 
mesh with politics, which begins not with targets, but with tangible issues (Tiili 2007). 
Fundamentally, NPM reforms do not just present politicians with a new collection of tools 
and instruments. Rather, their adoption requires both a shift in values and a change in 
perspectives, which cannot be achieved overnight.  
Moreover, reforms quite often lead to an enlarged workload and there is evidence that 
increasingly challenging working conditions are elevating stress levels (Gruening 1998). It 
may be too much to demand that party group leaders, who already combine their political 
work with other professional activities, thoroughly familiarize themselves with NPM. Some 
authors have even questioned whether less knowledge in this area is, in fact, problematic at 
all from the point of view of either politicians or voters. As Pollitt (2001) suggests, a limited 
affinity for NPM‟s principles, could better enable party group leaders to pursue their political 
goals, as well as help them to cope with conflicting demands from their constituents.  
Despite the prevailing skepticism regarding local politicians‟ adoption of NPM principles, our 
research makes it clear that some individual factors do aid some party group leaders in 
gaining more familiarity with these concepts than others. The balance of power is of 
overriding importance: those politicians in the majority are more familiar with NPM; yet 
another demonstration of how the executive branch dominates „ordinary‟ council members. 
Multiple mandates, which give councilors even more opportunities to familiarize themselves 
with reforms, also help. Additionally, certain party group leaders are in a better position to 
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benefit from this knowledge because they have the advantage of greater experience with 
financial information, either through professional or political use. Generally, politicians have 
limited economic training, which could encourage some party group leaders to use their 
expertise to strengthen their council position. A firm grasp of NPM, particularly where 
reforms have already been legislated for, would be an additional asset in terms of personal 
ambition. 
Furthermore, our findings corroborate results from other studies showing that there is very 
little evidence to suggest that NPM either coalesced or caught on in any particular ideological 
context (Hood 1995, Guthrie, Olson, and Humphrey 1998). Rather, the transmission of these 
concepts appears to have been the result of a more general process of policy diffusion – and 
not the consequence of changes in the political landscape (Hood 1995). Certainly, the 
predominance of coalition governments in many Flemish municipalities means that the 
strong divergence between left and right observed elsewhere is probably less clear-cut and of 
more minor relevance here (Goeminne, Geys, and Smolders 2008).  
Finally, a word of caution: these results should, just as with other findings, be interpreted 
with care. This study is based solely on the self-reported assessments of a specific group of 
councilors, and although some of party group leaders‟ personal factors did prove relevant, 
their overall influence was limited. We need to further improve our understanding of the 
processes that translate institutional NPM reform into political behavior. For example, 
(meso) organizational-level factors could play an important role in this context (March and 
Olsen 2006).  
Nevertheless, our findings are relevant - not just for theoretical reasons, but also for the 
future of NPM reforms in local government. Information campaigns could be better targeted, 
focusing on those groups where additional efforts seem necessary to increase their familiarity 
with, and trust in, the fundamentals of modernization. The research presented here indicates 
that opposition leaders and less experienced municipal councilors would benefit from such 
an approach. Without improving politicians‟ knowledge of NPM principles and instruments, 
there can be no genuine expectation that government reforms will be implemented properly, 
regardless of how much legislation is passed. 
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10. Appendix  
Table 1: Model variables 
 
  
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:  NPM_ Familiarity coefficient 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES/Key components 
Variable References Measure Source 
Formal 
political role 
Ezzamel et al. (2005) 
Olislagers et al. (2009) 
Askim (2009) Verhelst 
et al. (2011) 
Dummy for opposition (0) or majority 
(1)  
Flemish Home Office, 
database local mandates 
(2012) 
Ideology  Hood (1995),  Devos et 
al. (2006),  Bel et al. 
(2007), Reynaert 
(2012), Verhelst and 
Kerrouche, (2012), 
Steyvers and Verhelst 
(2012b)  
Positions of political parties on a left-
right scale with 0 representing extreme 
left and 10 representing extreme right, 
from politicians‟ viewpoints 
Ecologists = 2.40, Socialists = 3.35, 
Nationalists = 7.05, Christian 
Democrats = 5.78, Liberals = 6.49, 
Extreme Right = 9.19 
Devos et al. (2006) 
Financial 
expertise 
Alijarde (1997) Guthrie, 
et al. (1999) 
Dummy for professional use of financial 
information (1) vs. not (0) 
Survey council party group 
leaders 
Combination 
of political 
mandates 
Weekers et al. (2007) 
Askim (2008, 2009) 
 
Dummy for combination of 
international, national, regional, 
provincial or local executive (mayor or 
aldermen) political mandate (1) vs. only 
local political mandate (0)  
Belgian Bulletin of Acts, 
Orders and Decrees (12 
August 2011) 
 
ADDITIONAL VARIABLES (career development- 
Gender Hofstede (1998), Fox 
and Schuhmann 
(1999), Steyvers et al. 
(2010), Steyvers and 
Verhelst (2012b) 
Dummy for male (0) or female (1) Survey council party group 
leaders 
Economic 
education  
Olislagers et al. (2009), 
Askim (2009),  
Reynaert et al. (2010) 
Dummy for economic education 
(economics, applied economics, 
commercial school, tax, banking, 
marketing, commercial science, 
management or insurance, ... at all 
levels)  (1) vs. not (0) 
Survey council party group 
leaders 
Profession  Reynaert (2012) Dummy for full time politician, self-
employed and cabinet employees (1) vs. 
other (civil servants, teachers, non 
actives, laborers, office workers) (0) 
Survey council party group 
leaders   
 
Age Askim (2009) Age Survey council party group 
leaders 
Polity Size  (Askim 2009, Steyvers 
and Verhelst 2012b) 
Population in municipality (2011) Belgian Federal Public 
Service Economy 2011 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of all variables in the model 
Dependent variable:   
NPM_ Familiarity coefficient 
Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. 
5 25 15.01 3.78 
Experience 
 
0.1 41 12.00 8.13 
Ideology 2.4 9.19 5.76 2.06 
Polity Size  2133 116741 19967.06 15403.12 
Age   27 78 50.76 10.97 
      
Formal Pol.  Role opposition 55.5% Ec. Education  no  76.9% 
  majority 44.2%   yes 22.8% 
Fin. Expertise no 40.5% Profession  yes 29.2% 
  yes 59.5%   no 70.8% 
Combination Mandates no 89.6% Gender  male 75.3% 
  yes 10.4%   female 24.5% 
 
Table 4: Mean scores of the NPM Familiarity Coefficient’s five components 
  Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. 
          
Municipal management team 1 5 3.28 1.031 
Internal control 1 5 2.82 1.045 
Management control and policy cycle 1 5 2.66 1.025 
Budget ownership 1 5 2.98 1.033 
Autonomization 1 5 3.25 1.055 
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12. End notes
                                                        
1 Vlaamse Regering, Ontwerp van Memorie van Toelichting bij het ontwerp van Gemeentedecreet, 
25/05/2005. 
2 The first is budget ownership (art. 158 Flemish LGA); the second, internal control (art. 99 Flemish 
LGA); the third, management team (art. 95 Flemish LGA); the fourth, management control and policy 
cycle (title IV Flemish LGA and Decision of the Flemish Government of 25 June 2010); and the fifth, 
autonomization (art. 231-245 Flemish LGA). 
3 The BBC is being introduced in all Flemish municipalities between 2011 and 2014, and although it 
has not yet been implemented everywhere, there have been many pilot municipalities and numerous 
information sessions. 
4 In this study, the combination of mandates at the local level has been limited to mayoral and 
aldermen‟s positions. All of the other local mandates often held by faction leaders in Flanders in 
autonomous municipal organizations, including welfare centers, the fire brigade, inter-municipal 
housing companies or the police force, have been excluded. 
5 107 out of the 124 members of the Flemish regional parliament had a local mandate - half as 
municipal councilors (Weekers et al., 2007). 
6 One = not very familiar, two = a little familiar, three = neutral, neither a little nor very familiar, four 
= very familiar, five = quite familiar. They could also indicate that they did not know, or did not wish to 
answer. 
7 Stratification was based on “Dexia clustering”, which takes into account some 150 socio-economic 
variables. This is the most frequently used method for clustering Flemish municipalities in academic 
research (e.g., (Goeminne and Smolders 2010)) 
8 No difference between the non-respondents and the late respondents (T 0.7, p.0.47)(Armstrong and 
Overton 1977).  
9 Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis: (1 component: management team:  0.76, internal 
control: 0.80, management control: 0.71, budget ownership: 0.76, autonomization: 0.55) 
10 (Anova, F. 0.73, p. 0.66) 
11 (T 0.4, p 0.68) 
12 According to the Shapiro-Wilk test of normality (0.99; p. 0.022) we can accept the null hypothesis of 
normal distribution at 1% significance level. Graphic representation in histogram, boxplot and QQ 
plots support this assumption. 
13 Stepwise regression was performed as an additional analytical refinement, and reveals the same 
significant variables, with combination of mandates and financial expertise as predictors (adj. R² 0.04) 
14 Logistic regression was performed as alternative, in order to obtain a higher R² value, however the 
model proved inappropriate (Chi² 15.24, p. 0.12). 
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STUDY 2: TALKING NUMBERS? 
ANALYZING THE PRESENCE OF FINANCIAL 
INFORMATION IN COUNCILORS‟ SPEECH 
DURING THE BUDGET DEBATE IN 
FLEMISH MUNICIPAL COUNCILS. 
 
Abstract  
This paper provides new empirical evidence about Flemish municipal councilors‟ use of 
financial information in the yearly budget debate. Since councilors generally do not handle 
information according to „standard use models‟, we adopt an innovative method of data 
collection by scrutinizing their speech during the budget debate in Flemish municipalities for 
the presence of financial information. The incorporation of financial information in 
councilors‟ contributions to the debate is conceptualized as a particular form of observable 
use of financial information. We quantitatively assess the presence of both budgetary and 
accrual financial information using a scoring technique taken from the management 
accounting literature. Additionally, we analyze whether various political and financial 
circumstances affect politicians‟ mentioning of this information in their deliberations. Our 
results reveal a strong prevalence of budgetary information in councilors‟ speech. This is 
influenced by both political conditions and the financial position of the municipality.  
Key words: Financial information use, councilors, budget, speech. 
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1. Introduction 
Operational financial information traditionally has two uses: decision influencing and 
decision facilitating (Demski and Feltham 1976). This is linked to the idea that providing 
politicians with high-quality financial information can help them make better decisions in 
terms of, inter alia, setting political priorities, linking resources to performance targets and 
controlling and monitoring governmental activities (Lapsley 1999, Askim 2007, Beckett-
Camarata 2009, Yetano 2009, Carvalho, Gomes, and José Fernandes 2012, Ter Bogt, van 
Helden, and Van der Kolk forthcoming). Consequently, providing high-quality financial 
information has been an element in budget reforms for decades (Ho 2011). While it is 
considered a prerequisite that politicians apply the provided financial information for 
decision-making (see e.g., Guthrie, Olson, and Humphrey (1999), Curristine (2005), Windels 
and Christiaens (2006)), many studies, particularly in the domain of performance 
information, have shown that politicians do not apply information in the same way as 
decision-makers in other, businesslike contexts (Ter Bogt 2001, Ter Bogt 2004, Moynihan 
2006, Nasi and Steccolini 2008, Johansson and Siverbo 2009, Askim 2009, Ter Bogt, van 
Helden, and Van der Kolk forthcoming).  
Moreover, there is little empirical evidence about this atypical use pattern or about the 
factors that affect politicians‟ utilization of financial information in practice (Van Helden and 
Northcott 2010)
1
. While previous studies have discussed various technical and political 
budgeting aspects (e.g., political budget cycles, reform rhetoric, the introduction of accrual 
budgeting), the application of specific information in the area of budgeting is often 
overlooked (Raudla 2012). In the same vein, although the production, adoption and 
implementation of all types of financial and particularly performance information has 
received considerable attention in the public sector literature, investigating the actual use of 
this information for decision-making has always constituted a negligible part of the research 
agenda (Julnes and Holzer 2002, Raudla 2012, Torres, Pina, and Martí 2012).  
Rather than studying performance information as output measure, this study focuses on the 
input side, that is, the financial information that provides essential data for budgetary 
decision-making. The available studies on politicians‟ use of information in the budget cycle 
have predominantly focused on the executive branch or on budget committees at the national 
or parliamentary level (Curristine 2005, Demaj and Summermatter 2012). However, 
alongside the importance assigned to executive and higher political echelons, the smaller 
scope and more direct nature of local government deserve more attention, not least because 
local non-executive politicians‟ application of financial information may be more visible and 
thus more amenable to scholarship (Melkers and Willoughby 2005). Therefore, this article 
focuses on non-executive local elected representatives in municipalities. These individuals 
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are elected members of the local council and operate outside the executive board (the 
executive board comprises the mayor and the aldermen). In a European context, the elected 
members of the local council operating outside the executive board are generally called 
„councilors‟. 
This paper addresses the lack of empirical evidence about councilors‟ use of financial 
information in practice by quantifying the presence of both budgetary and accrual 
information in their speech during the budget debate held yearly in all Flemish municipal 
councils. To this end, we draw on studies that consider speech as a form of individual action, 
that is, studies that understand speech as an utterance and thus as „observable‟ instances of 
financial information use (see e.g., Imbeau (2009)). In accordance with the study of Ter Bogt, 
van Helden, and Van der Kolk (forthcoming) we expect that positive valuation of the 
information would become visible in the content of councilors‟ speech. 
The paper is structured as follows: the first section discusses the need for a nuanced attitude 
towards politicians‟ atypical information usage patterns. This is followed by an elaboration of 
our actor-centered, neo-institutional framework and the political and financial factors under 
study. The third part contains our data collection, the method used and the results. Finally, 
conclusions are discussed.  
2. Politics by numbers? 
Academics and practitioners are generally skeptical about the usefulness and application of 
specific financial information for political purposes (Askim 2007, Demaj and Summermatter 
2012, Raudla 2012) 
2
. Many attempts to integrate financial information in political decision-
making have either led to disappointment or failure (Ho 2011, Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). 
The reasons and motives for this skepticism have been empirically established, mostly by 
means of using survey and interview data in the area of performance information (see for 
instance Ter Bogt (2004), Curristine (2005), Melkers and Willoughby (2005), Askim (2009), 
Johansson and Siverbo (2009), Liguori, Sicilia, and Steccolini (2012). Based on various 
studies in the domain of budgeting and use of performance information we criticize this 
common position and advance some arguments for a more nuanced attitude, particularly 
regarding usage of financial information in practice. 
Firstly, the supply of financial information presupposes a technocratic and managerial 
rationality, whereas in practice budgeting follows a political rationality rather than anything 
else (Ter Bogt, van Helden, and Van der Kolk forthcoming). The budget forms the basis for 
political negotiations and translates political goals into appropriations of financial resources 
(Liguori, Sicilia, and Steccolini 2012). This means that budgeting is by nature highly political 
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and that decisions result from political and ideological considerations rather than from 
considerations of financial performance (Raudla 2012). Political rationality, as opposed to 
economic and technocratic rationality, seems to be the key issue in this regard. Moreover, 
politicians are often negatively predisposed to financial information due to factors such as the 
complexity of local policymaking, legal constraints, a misfit between strategic planning and 
budgeting, an unclear role distinction between politicians and administrators, and the short-
term horizon of many politicians (Hansen 2001, Schedler 2003, Ter Bogt 2004, Steyvers et 
al. 2006, Ho 2006, van Dooren and Van de Walle 2008, van Dooren, Bouckaert, and 
Halligan 2010, Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). 
Secondly, specific information is often too quickly regarded as not relevant or not used 
because researchers apply a classic or overly rigid definition of use, somehow neglecting the 
decision influence and facilitating role of financial information in public debate (van Dooren, 
Bouckaert, and Halligan 2010). Politicians‟ processing of information is generally less 
formalized and less straightforward than documents suggest. For example, there is evidence 
that politicians seldom make direct, instrumental use of performance information (Askim 
2007). Rare are the cases in which a decision can be traced back to specific information (van 
Dooren and Van de Walle 2008). Decision outcomes are unlikely to have a systematic 
relationship with financial information in a way that is easily observable for researchers 
(Moynihan 2006). Particularly, while information does not directly impact politicians‟ 
decisions in some automatic, mechanical way, it often forms the basis for discussions that 
may afterwards lead to decisions (de Lancer Julnes 2006, Beckett-Camarata 2009). van 
Dooren, Bouckaert, and Halligan (2010) make a distinction between „hard‟ and „soft‟ use. 
Hard use presupposes a tight coupling between information and judgment. Soft use, on the 
other hand, leaves more room for dialogue and interpretation, which mediate the final 
decision. It is a form of interpretative use through which information feeds deliberation and 
discussion.  
Concerning the specific interpretative use of information in political discourse, studies on the 
speech of members in the political sphere identified five main specifications: displaying, 
concealing, justification (and legitimacy), contestation and correcting discrepancies (Imbeau 
2009). During the budget debate, financial information operates as a tool to highlight specific 
political issues. This corresponds with what Askim and Baldersheim (2012) point out about 
politicians‟ application of financial information to activate the political debate, set the 
political agenda and alleviate informational dissymmetry between the legislative and the 
executive branch. During budget meetings, politicians aim to improve the quality of 
discussions and create legitimacy by identifying problems and bringing them up in 
discussions, thus pointing to differences between intended and actual performance. Other 
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incentives include media attention, the fact that budget debates are open to the public, and 
political opportunity. Councilors may see the budget debate as an opportunity for attracting 
votes, for instance (Carvalho, Gomes, and José Fernandes 2012).  
In sum, there have been distinctive „negative‟ and more nuanced findings concerning 
councilors‟ use of specific information (mostly performance information). Although this is 
not entirely unexpected, the question remains whether this also applies to more „input-like‟ 
financial information. Thus far, most findings (including findings related to performance 
information) have drawn on provoked or indirect data, which does not directly reveal 
politicians‟ practice. Given the assumption that financial information is used when provided, 
we will focus particularly on councilors‟ actual practice (Demaj and Summermatter 2012). 
3. Theoretical framework 
Our aim is to study councilors‟ speech as an expression of their use of financial information 
within the institutional context of budget discussions. As some scholars have already noted, 
„information is not innocent‟, that is, information selection and use occur within the context 
of different beliefs, motives and preferences and thus will simultaneously reflect and be 
affected by organizational conditions (Moynihan 2006).  
How do we combine our councilors‟ behavior and preferences within the context of their 
municipality into a sound theoretical framework? The actor-centered, institutionalist 
perspective attributes equal weight to individual action and institutions but also stresses the 
mutual interaction between actors and institutional structures (Scharpf 1997). This means 
that our subjects are likely to be influenced by certain institutions in their environment 
(Moynihan 2006, Carmeli 2006, Carvalho, Gomes, and José Fernandes 2012).  For our 
purposes, this implies that in addition to quantifying the presence of budgetary and accrual 
financial information, this article examines which (local) conditions could affect councilors‟ 
motives and preferences for using financial information in their speech.  
In the actor-centered, institutional perspective, no theoretically defined set of variables is 
systematized and operationalized to serve as explanatory variables in empirical research 
(Scharpf 1997). As a consequence, to identify the influencing conditions in politicians‟ 
environment we rely on studies about related accounting innovations, e.g., the use of cost 
information, financial transparency and performance information. These mostly combine a 
contingency and institutionalist approach and identify political and economic conditions as 
most powerful for explaining politicians‟ use of certain information, as illustrated in figure 1 
(Vakkuri and Meklin 2003, Giroux and McLelland 2003, Brugue and Valles 2005, Egner and 
Heinelt 2008, Bastida, Benito, and Guillamón 2009, Krebs and Pelissero 2010, Le Maux, 
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Rocaboy, and Goodspeed 2011, Caamaño-Alegre et al. 2012, Carvalho, Gomes, and José 
Fernandes 2012). Although it has been demonstrated that institutional (political, financial) 
settings are blurred by certain combinations of individual characteristics, accounting for 
these characteristics falls outside the scope of this study. It is practically impossible to 
integrate all the personal characteristics that capture the complex notion of councilors‟ 
individual preferences regarding financial information. In general, Flemish (European) 
councilors have very limited financial or accounting knowledge and expertise (Reynaert 2012, 
Buylen and Christiaens 2014). A recent study by Buylen and Christiaens (2014) demonstrates 
that individual characteristics do play a role in explaining councilors‟ familiarity with New 
Public Management instruments and concepts but that their impact is very limited.
3
 
Moreover, our subjects will always selectively present financial information in a context that 
supports their point of view and this is less determined by their own capacities (Moynihan 
2006).  
Figure 1: Theoretical framework 
 
  Actor- centered, institutional perspective 
COUNCILORS+ INSTITUTIONS 
Contingency Theory 
POLITICAL CONDITIONS:  
*Political competition and 
discord 
*Political fragmentation 
*Identity of council chair 
*Executive verbal 
explanation 
FINANCIAL POSITION: 
*Fiscal pressure 
*Tax rate 
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4. Political and financial determinants on councilors’ application of 
financial information in their speech during the budget debate 
The variables under study have been chosen with the aim of analyzing the impact of some 
financial or political conditions on politicians‟ integration of financial information in their 
speech. Furthermore, we have considered the control variable suggested by the literature.  
4.1 Political conditions 
Political competition and discord 
Political conditions influence the use and application of information (Julnes and Holzer 
2002, Caamaño-Alegre et al. 2012). As shown in previous studies on speech, the presence of 
political extremes in the council generate more comments and discussion (Imbeau 2009). 
The complexity of the Flemish political context, with its many coalition majorities, cartel lists 
and local (non-national) parties, prevents us from integrating ideological variables.4 But 
ideology is not the only political condition to consider. Another key factor – political 
competition – influences public spending and the pre-budget deliberation stage. We can 
assume that it influences the budget discussion as well (Le Maux, Rocaboy, and Goodspeed 
2011). Both high and low competition may have an impact on the use of financial information 
in the debate. On the one hand, budgeting practices will be more transparent in systems 
marked by high political competition and polarization (Caamaño-Alegre et al. 2012). A 
competitive political climate may stimulate debate and increase councilors‟ use of financial 
information in their contributions to the discussion because numerical and financial 
information could untangle discussions that have reached a deadlock due to ideological, 
inter-party or interpersonal struggles (Askim 2008, Caamaño-Alegre et al. 2012). On the 
other hand, a deliberative political climate characterized by a consensus-seeking atmosphere 
could also encourage the use of financial information because this situation facilitates fact-
oriented discussions (Askim 2008). 
Political fragmentation 
Political fragmentation is another key factor that determines financial and budgetary 
conditions (Le Maux, Rocaboy, and Goodspeed 2011, Bastida, Benito, and Guillamón 2009). 
In a coalition consisting of different parties, power is spread over more parties. Each party 
would be likely to wield the highest possible political power, so governing in coalitions tends 
to be more complicated, as control over policy is heavily dispersed compared with single-
party majority groupings. This situation would bring about more discussion and debate 
between coalition partners than a single-party majority would and may therefore lead to 
more use of financial information by the councilors. 
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Identity of council chair 
Furthermore, a particular Flemish political institutional characteristic relates to the person of 
the council chair. Flemish councils can either appoint a „non-executive‟ councilor or the 
mayor (or another aldermen, but this is very exceptional) as chairman. This could influence 
the content of the budget discussion, as a non-executive councilor chair might show more 
openness for debate and discussion. A mayor-chair will be inclined to defend the incumbents‟ 
policy and budget proposal thus leaving fewer opportunities for debate and discussion. So a 
more neutral and impartial councilor chair would be expected to stimulate discussion and be 
more receptive to deliberation on the executive‟s budget proposal (Reynaert, Steyvers, and 
Verhelst 2010). We expect more financial information in councilors‟ speech in councils with a 
non-executive chair. 
Executive verbal explanation 
Finally, we add a factor that may indirectly affect the political situation in the council. As the 
budget format itself is found to have only limited or marginal effect on budget deliberations 
(see e.g., Grizzle (1986), Ter Bogt, van Helden, and Van der Kolk (forthcoming), we argue 
that verbally presenting the budget at the start of the council‟s meeting could encourage 
councilors to contribute to the discussion referring to financial information. Moreover, 
research on Dutch aldermen‟s use of performance information revealed that they prefer rich, 
verbal and interpreted information (Ter Bogt 2004). By interpreting and explaining the 
budget, the executive could show more openness and transparency towards the council, thus 
stimulating the discussion and indirectly enhancing the presence of financial information in 
the debate. 
4.2 Financial position: tax rate and debt  
Motives to refer to financial information during the budget debate can obviously be found in 
the current financial position of the municipality, as both majority and opposition members 
might integrate financial information in their arguments to improve or criticize the financial 
situation of their municipality. The overall economic conditions tend to impact budgetary 
transparency in general and as we do not apply a theoretical framework with clearly defined 
variables, we focus on two, „high profile‟, politically sensitive financial indicators that are 
managed and controlled by the local government: tax rate and debt rate (Bastida, Benito, and 
Guillamón 2009, Caamaño-Alegre et al. 2012, Carvalho, Gomes, and José Fernandes 2012).
5
 
These local financial parameters could urge councilors to refer to the necessity of expenditure 
constraints, cutback budgeting, etc. In the occurrence of high debt rate councilors might turn 
their political priorities towards freezing budgets, and this could entail specific attention for 
financial information. Consequently, councilors may integrate more financial information 
related to potential savings and rationalization in their contributions to the discussion 
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(Johansson and Siverbo 2009). Additionally, when the tax burden is higher, taxpayers might 
be more critical towards the council, and, in our setting, this possibly leads to more 
financially-oriented remarks and questions from councilors (Caamaño-Alegre et al. 2012). 
Both low debt and low tax rates could point in the direction of a comfortable financial 
position. 
Finally, we introduce size as a control variable (Krebs and Pelissero 2010). Size reflects 
organizational complexity, the local government‟s information-processing environment, and 
the magnitude and scope of the information to be handled. In this way, it also influences 
budgeting practices (Nasi and Steccolini 2008, Bastida, Benito, and Guillamón 2009). The 
way in which political and financial conditions are concretized into variables is illustrated in 
Table 4 in the appendix. 
5. Method 
Our methodological approach draws on the scoring technique applied in the management or 
accounting index and the disclosure index (Christiaens 1999, Windels and Christiaens 2006, 
Pina, Torres, and Yetano 2009). It can also be considered as a specific form of content 
analysis on political speech, using words as data, which has already been utilized in political 
studies (e.g., Laver, Benoit, and Garry (2003), Imbeau (2009) or for measuring New Public 
Management elements in political rhetoric (e.g., Fattore, Dubois, and Lapenta (2012). 
Without employing specialist techniques designed for the deconstruction of texts, we analyze 
the contributions to budget discussions made by non-executive councilors in order to assess 
the presence of financial information in these discussions.
6
 We manually examined each 
councilor‟s contribution. This approach requires expertise in interpreting complex, elaborate 
and underlying meanings and argumentation in the discussion.
7
 The decision to adopt this 
approach was supported by our understanding that human behavior and, by extension, 
political discourse cannot be easily coded with general terms. A solely computer-aided 
analysis would have been inadequate and would have missed vital elements.  
The chosen method has evident advantages. Similar to the Interpretive Clustering Approach, 
it relies on „naturally occurring‟ data rather than on, for example, „provoked‟ data (Huxham 
and Hibbert 2011). As Huxham and Hibbert (2011) demonstrated, data derived from action 
settings are likely to be unique. The method‟s value lies in its potential to capture what 
happens when people are acting „for real‟. In our study, budget discussions could enable us to 
collect information about councilors‟ apparent, indirect and „soft‟ use of financial 
information. When we consider that the debate evokes „authentic‟ behavior, the presence of 
financial information in councilors‟ speech would allow us to measure their apparent „soft‟ 
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use of financial information rather precisely.
8
 This presents a clear advantage over asking 
councilors about their intended or perceived use in interviews or surveys. Although the latter 
approach has been widely adopted, its reliability depends on the respondents‟ correct 
understanding and subjective interpretation of the questions (Steyvers et al. 2006). Survey 
results and even data from interviews must be viewed with caution since they have a clear 
bias towards desirable use and they do not necessarily inform us about actual behavior 
(Schiff and Hoffman 1996, Poister and Streib 1999, Raudla 2013). However, while 
acknowledging the advantages of analyzing councilors‟ contributions in the budget meetings, 
we also need to recognize the limitations of this method. In our research setting, we only 
count a councilor‟s use of financial information in combination with the type of financial 
topic he/she addresses. For example, we examine the relative importance of a certain 
expenditure category or the debt position but not the consequences of  interpellations on the 
final budget. 
6. Operationalization of financial information 
In order to scrutinize the minutes, we must clearly define what is meant by „financial 
information‟. Just as Liguori, Sicilia, and Steccolini (2012) did, we included both budgetary 
(i.e. cash-based) and accrual (i.e. based on accrual accounting) financial information, as 
evidence shows that they occur together and are used altogether under the heading of 
financial information. Additionally, we determined if this financial information occurs in the 
debate without considering the underlying accounting system. The operationalization by 
Liguori, Sicilia, and Steccolini (2012) of budgetary financial information consists of 8 items 
(revenues and funding sources; current expenditure by nature; current expenditure by 
destination; capital expenditure by nature; capital expenditure by destination; level transfers 
to other local entities; budgetary surplus or deficit; establishment of accounts receivable to be 
recovered and commitments to be paid). Likewise, accrual accounting includes 6 items that 
are distinct from budgetary information (liability; receivables; assets; cost of activities; cost of 
service delivery and depreciation).  
7. Councilors and budgeting procedures in Flemish municipalities 
Our subjects are elected every six years. As in other European countries, they are mainly male 
(73%), middle-aged (50 years old on average), highly educated (68% have obtained a 
university education) and middle-class. Most come from talking and brokerage professions 
such as teaching, law and the self-employed professions (Reynaert 2012). A large majority is 
involved in politics on a part-time basis: on average Flemish councilors spend 7.36 
hours/week on political activities (preparing council meetings, formulating verbal or written 
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questions and reading documents). For these activities they receive very limited support, this 
is particularly the case in smaller councils (Olislagers, Ackaert, and De Rynck 2009).   
Concerning relevant personal aspects, there is limited data available on the finance-related 
professional backgrounds of the individuals studied. Around 20% of the council fraction 
leaders (a small subgroup of our research subjects) received some sort of previous economic 
education and 60% claims to have some kind of financial expertise, although their experience 
is mainly limited to „working with numbers‟ and few are actually acquainted with budgetary 
affairs such as management control and budget ownership (Buylen and Christiaens 2014).  
The Flemish municipalities themselves could be characterized as being in „transition‟. Until 
the mid-1990s, the financial management of Flemish municipalities was, like that of local 
governments in many other countries, traditionally highly input-oriented, with control based 
on budgets and administrative procedures. The Flemish case is particularly interesting 
because, in 1995, the traditional cash accounting system in municipalities was complemented 
with business-like accrual accounting (Windels and Christiaens 2006). It is therefore possible 
to study politicians‟ use of the two types of information, as the traditional budgetary cash 
accounting information has been supplemented (but not replaced!) with accrual-based 
reporting (balance sheet and operating statement) since 1995.9 The budget procedure is quite 
homogeneous; each municipality sets up a budget draft in August or September. This draft is 
then discussed by the College of Mayor and Aldermen (the municipality‟s executive board) 
and the budget proposal that develops from these negotiations is brought to the town council 
for ratification (Goeminne, Geys, and Smolders 2008). During the final public council 
meeting, all councilors have the formal opportunity to comment on the budget proposal and 
to present amendments, which can either be approved one-by-one or as a total package. This 
means that, at least in theory, councilors have the opportunity to actually modify the budget. 
8. Data  
We present a new way of assessing the presence of financial information by analyzing the 
words of the budget debate. Our data thus consist of a succession of words (Laver, Benoit, 
and Garry 2003). We measure the presence of financial information during the budget 
debate in a formal and a neutral way, i.e. as it appears from the official minutes of those 
meetings. These minutes contain the literal transcriptions of the discussions during the 
budget debate.
10
 121 minutes of the debate on the 2011 budget were selected by stratified 
random sampling to cover the full variety of Flemish municipalities.
11
 Table 6 in the appendix 
describes the councils in the sample. We selected the 2011 budget discussion to eliminate 
electoral effects as much as possible. Municipal elections took place in 2006 and late 2012, 
Study 2: Talking numbers? 
46 
 
meaning that the 2011 budget (debate December 2010) would still be somewhat free from the 
municipal electoral cycle. Additionally, between August and October 2011 we conducted 5 
semi-structured interviews with highly placed civil servants who were non-participating 
experts in the budget discussion.
12
 They were asked to comment on how the budget was 
discussed in municipal councils and, on the basis of their experience, which factors could 
impede or advance the presence of financial information in the discussion. The interviews 
lasted between 1 and 2 hours. The content of the interviews was used to gain insight into the 
budget discussion in the councils. To avoid any bias, the interviewees were not informed 
about the results of the minutes‟ analyses. 
9. Evidence from interviews 
Our interviewees described the budget debate as the most important meeting of the year, 
although sometimes it was described as merely symbolic and traditional. Although the 
preceding political negotiations take place earlier in closed budget committees or private 
political meetings, our interviewees reported that similar arguments are repeated during the 
plenary debate. The budget discussion itself is very heterogeneous, with very long and intense 
discussions in some councils and virtually no discussion in others. Some councils start the 
meeting with an elaborate verbal presentation, mostly by aldermen responsible for finance or 
by the financial manager of the municipality, while other councils discuss the budget 
proposal in less than a minute. Generally speaking, our experts were quite disappointed 
about the content of the discussion and the councilors‟ lack of strategic policy focus. Their 
remarks very often concern details about specific investments, projects, various aspects of 
service delivery and operational aspects. They describe the debate as  “purely political, rarely 
containing hard facts and numbers – a reiteration of the traditional show of majority against 
opposition”. Our interviewees suggested that, even when councilors did use financial 
information, it was not in an „analytical sense‟, but rather to express tangible, short-term 
aspects. One interviewee said: “Councilors argue more about a 100-euro subsidy than about 
million-euro investments; they talk about all possible details of investments but not about its 
effect on debt rate”. However, contrastingly, in some cases councilors seize the opportunity to 
elaborate on their political priorities and the discussion is well prepared, well grounded and 
substantial. A clear manifestation of this is the proposition of amendments, although they 
rarely lead to effective budget changes.
13
 Finally, our interviewees were not able to describe 
the roles of the different actors in general terms but they mention party group leaders, the 
chair, the mayor and the aldermen for finance as central actors in the discussion, although in 
some municipalities „ordinary councilors‟ also frequently intervene. 
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10. Results: financial information in councilors’ speech 
What type of financial information becomes visible in the budget discussion? Our results in 
Table 1 reveal considerable differences between debates and between financial items. The 
variety in the discussion observed by our interviewees corroborates our findings. The total 
financial information score of the debates ranges from 108 occurrences of financial 
information to absolutely none. The mean of the different financial items is rather low, with 
on average one or two references to financial information per debate. This suggests that 
politicians may also attach importance to non-financial, informal, qualitative or policy-
related information and that the hard facts, numbers and figures are less present in the 
discussion. Our findings thus confirm earlier evidence for the use of non-financial 
information from surveys and case studies (Ter Bogt 2001, Demaj and Summermatter 2012, 
Liguori, Sicilia, and Steccolini 2012, Raudla 2012).  
Moreover, the variance of the specific financial information used by councilors was 
remarkable: there were 57 references to capital expenditure (by destination) as opposed to no 
references to depreciation, receivables and commitments. Not surprisingly, councilors 
contribute significantly more to the debate by referring to budgetary cash information than to 
accrual information.
14
 This result supports previous studies stating that “the importance of 
cash-based budgetary accounting is overwhelming whereas the marginality of accrual based 
reporting is evident” (Nasi and Steccolini 2008). However, the Flemish local budgeting 
context could also play a role in this disparity. Due to the absence of accrual budgeting, there 
is a time lag of several months between the availability of the accrual accounts and the budget 
discussion. All in all, our evidence for the apparent use of financial information suggests an 
emphasis on operational matters and the related non-financial policy information. This 
observation is largely related to another issue pertaining to the operational versus the 
strategic focus exhibited by councilors (Liguori, Sicilia, and Steccolini 2009). 
  
Study 2: Talking numbers? 
48 
 
Table 1: Frequency of financial information items in 121 debates 
 Budgetary Min Max Mean St. Dev. 
Capital expenditure by destination 0 57 5.33 8.592 
Revenues and funding sources 0 15 2.5 3.12 
Current expenditure by destination 0 23 2.01 3.848 
Current expenditure by nature 0 24 1.93 3.329 
Transfers of other municipal entities 0 21 1.72 2.864 
Budgetary surplus or deficit 0 8 1.12 1.464 
Capital expenditure by nature 0 7 0.76 1.31 
Accounts receivables or commitment to be paid 0 0 0 0 
 
Accrual 
    Liability 0 11 1.17 1.854 
Cost of services 0 9 0.54 1.323 
Cost of activities 0 4 0.19 0.596 
Assets 0 3 0.1 0.374 
Receivables 0 1 0.02 0.128 
Depreciation 0 0 0 0 
 
Total score     
Accrual 0 16 2.01 3.01 
Budgetary 0 99 15.37 17.96 
Budgetary and Accrual 0 108 17.38 20.14 
 
11. Results of testing the variables 
In order to test the variables under study, we computed a negative binominal regression 
analysis on the total financial information score.
 15
 This means that at the dependent level, we 
have the sum of the frequencies of both types of financial information.
16
 Table 2 presents the 
results of the analysis. An overview of the variables with descriptive statistics and a 
correlation table is included in the appendix (Tables 4 and 5). 
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Table 2: Negative binominal regression results 
TOTAL BUDGET SCORE 
POLITICAL CONDITIONS  
Competition                        -0.046 (11.24)*** 
Coalition                         0.443 (4.27)** 
Chair                         0.045 (0.06) 
Explanation                          0.495 (5.62)** 
FINANCIAL POSITION  
Tax rate                          0.001 (5.67)** 
Debt                          -0.000 (0.11) 
CONTROL  
Size                         0.000 (14.97)*** 
Negative binominal regression coefficients 
(Wald Chi² in parentheses) 
Sign.: ***1%, ** 5%  
LR (Likelihood Ratio) chi² (7) 42,95*** 
Log likelihood -451,56 
Adj. Log likelihood -528,55 
N  =   121 
 
The result of the regression analysis reveals a mix of political and financial significant and 
non-significant variables. 
17
 With respect to the political conditions, our competition variable 
shows that less political competition (implying a broader majority) generates a significantly 
lower frequency of financial information in the debate. The less competition in the council, 
the less financial information occurs in the budget debate. This is reinforced by the fact that 
in coalition majorities there is more presence of financial information, indicating that 
political competition within the executive also has a positive impact. Formulated otherwise: 
councilors talk less about financial information when there is a broad the majority in the 
council and when it consists of a single party. The supposition that a verbal explanation 
would stimulate discussion with financial information is confirmed, although this is not the 
case for the person of the chair. This is surprising because we assumed that a non-executive 
chair would also stimulate debate and discussion. This might be due to the relatively new 
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intermediary role of non-executive chairs, which might need more time to grow into their 
function. 
Concerning financial situation, tax rate directly affecting the citizens stimulates councilors to 
mention financial information. Debt does not, however, perhaps because its impact on the 
constituents is more indirect. 
Finally, size matters. In larger municipalities councilors integrate more financial information 
in their speech. This corroborates other studies that found that modernization initiatives 
have a higher passage rate in larger municipalities (Van Helden and Jansen 2003). As a 
result of larger control spans and the more frequent emergence of unprecedented situations, 
governing large-scale municipalities may present greater leadership challenges than small 
scale governing, which consequently leads to a greater necessity of financial information 
(Askim and Baldersheim 2012). Table 3 summarizes the results of testing the variables. 
Table 3: Summary of testing variables 
The presence of financial information in councilors‟ speech is … 
higher (or lower) in councils with much political competition Confirmed, higher 
higher in municipalities with high tax rate Confirmed 
higher when the budget is verbally explained Confirmed 
higher in councils with coalition majorities Confirmed 
higher in councils where the chair is a non-executive councilor Not confirmed 
higher in municipalities with a high debt rate Not confirmed 
 
12. Discussion and conclusion 
So do the costs and human effort required to produce (financial) information when financial 
information is not visibly brought up in budget deliberations really outweigh the benefits? 
Our subjects did not visibly use this „input-like‟ financial information to a greater extent than, 
for example, the outcome-oriented performance information. The limited presence of 
financial information in their speech during the budget debate thus confirms our 
interviewees‟ pessimistic attitude. Although still considered essential for efficient decision-
making, we must at least question the role of this type of hard, objective, numerical, factual 
information in political decision-making. Financial information may help interpret or clarify 
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the budget (see e.g., the significant effect of executive explanation) but will not eliminate 
politicians‟ different positions or foster consensual decision-making (Moynihan 2006). As 
Moynihan (2006) states about performance budgeting, “resolutions about allocation of 
resources are often a matter of agreement and shared understanding rather than factual 
(financial) information”. Because of the inherently political nature of budgeting in local 
government, no contributions with „hard‟ financial material will ever determine which 
councilor „wins‟ or „loses‟ the budget debate. Moreover, the total absence of discussion in 
some cases may point to the fact that in public-sector decision-making considerable 
allocations just follow from „objective‟ bureaucratic planning and take the form of „faits 
accomplis‟ where politicians find it very difficult to decide differently than as proposed by the 
bureaucracy (Jacobsen 2011).  
Although it may appear as if little has changed since the budget debates of the late 1980‟s, our 
„live action‟ data collection method enables us to nuance the prevailing opinions on 
politicians‟ use of financial information. The overall presence of financial information in the 
debates was low, but in some debates we did observe councilors mentioning this information. 
In some cases financial information can thus be used as an element in the discussion, not to 
influence decisions directly but as a basis for deliberation and debate. This brings about a 
more nuanced (and less rigid) image of the use of financial information than studies with 
other methods of data collection would propose. Various elements in our study plea for a 
more differentiated approach of politicians‟ use of this information. 
Firstly, despite their interrelatedness, cash-based budgetary information is still preferred 
over the new accrual reporting. This could be attributed to both the historical importance of 
the budget as an authorization document and to the complex issue of politicians‟ problematic 
internalization of new policy instruments in general, as we may consider accrual reporting 
information to be new (Hansen 2001, Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). Politicians tend to be 
resistant to change (Curristine 2005). In Flanders, as elsewhere in Europe, financial 
information has indeed been introduced into the existing budgetary context. Although only 
partially supported by our results, increased pressure on municipal finances could entail 
more attention for financial information from politicians and citizens in the future.  
Secondly, the extent to which councilors integrate financial information in their speech can 
only partially be justified by the political and financial situation in their municipality. 
Identifying those factors may be relevant to uncovering some of the triggers for the successful 
usage of financial information in local governance (Lowndes and Wilson 2003, Demaj and 
Summermatter 2012). However, the miscellany of significant variables prevents an obvious 
explanation. With respect to the political conditions, the balance of power between parties in 
the council may be decisive for the content of councilors‟ speech in the debate. The larger the 
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majority, the less discussion. As Buylen and Christiaens (2014) demonstrated, this effect is 
reinforced at the individual level because local council majority party group leaders are 
significantly better positioned in terms of familiarity with instruments and tools for effective 
policymaking. Given this dominance of the majority in the council, the opposition often uses 
alternative and informal ways to influence the budget, outside the official deliberations 
(Raudla 2012). In addition, the significance of size points to the relevance of the „couleur 
locale‟, i.e. the importance of other organizational and cultural factors as suggested by 
institutional theory (Lounsbury 2008).  
Thirdly, politicians‟ actual behavior, in contrast to survey or case study material, is not easily 
integrated into existing theories and models. By relying on a theoretical framework 
combining an actor-centered institutional perspective with some contingency factors, we 
obtained interesting results. However, this study is one of the first to systematically 
operationalize and analyze observable use of financial information. The regression analysis 
enables us to identify some political and financial conditions that influence this presence of 
financial information in politicians‟ speech. Nevertheless, we should keep in mind that, 
lacking more suited alternatives, we explained an aspect of politicians‟ behavior applying 
theories that were developed in another context, e.g., for assessing attitudes or intentions. 
They do not necessarily inform us about actual behavior. Future research could continue to 
address politicians‟ actual conduct and enable us to refine existing theoretical assumptions. It 
might also consider the effect of deliberations with financial information on the final 
budgetary decisions or on other important political issues. 
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13. Appendix 
Table 4: Variables in the model 
 
Table 5: Spearman correlations  
  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
1. Size 1 
      2. Competition -0.074 1 
     3. Explanation  0.164 -0.015 1 
    4. Chair 0.005 -0.09 -0.014 1 
   5. Tax rate -0.123 0.209* 0.002 -0.028 1 
  6. Debt 0.115 -0.153 0.003 -0.06 0.071 1 
 7. Coalition 0.096 0.223* 0.024 0.121 -0.114 0.045 1 
           
  
Variable Description~Measure  Descriptive statistics 
  Frequency Percent 
Chair      
 
Coalition 
 
Explanation 
Dummy for executive (1) 
councilor v. not (0) 
Dummy for coalition (1) v. not 
(0) 
 
Dummy for verbal explanation 
(1) v. not (0) 
  Executive = 74 
Non-executive = 47 
Coalition = 87 
One party = 34 
Explanation = 91 
No explanation = 30 
61.20% 
38.80% 
71.90% 
28.10% 
75.20% 
24.80% 
      Min.    Max.    Mean St. dev. 
Competition Majorities‟ electoral margin of 
victory, difference between 50% 
and % of majorities‟ vote share 
  -7.39 40.51 7.05 7.71 
Debt 
Tax rate 
Debt per capita   
Property tax rate  
  0 
750 
5335 
2200 
1114.99 
1319.83 
680.45 
289.55 
Size Population in municipality   2133 116741 18411.85 13738.89 
Total 
budget_score 
(dep. var.) 
Total score of financial 
information (budgetary and 
accrual) in budget debate 2011 
  0 108 17.38 20.14 
All data (except dependent variable) are sourced from the Flemish Home Office and the Belgian Federal 
Service for Economy and refer to 2010 (debt) and 2011 (competition, chair, coalition, explanation, tax 
rate and size). All N = 121 
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Table 6: Sample of councils 
Aarschot, Alken, Ardooie, Arendonk, As, Beringen, Berlaar, Bever, Beveren, Bierbeek, Bilzen, Bocholt, 
Boechout, Boortmeerbeek, Borgloon, Borsbeek, Boutersem, Brakel, Brasschaat, Bredene, Bree, 
Brugge, Deerlijk, Denderleeuw, Destelbergen, Diest, Diksmuide, Edegem, Erpe-Mere, Essen, Gavere, 
Geel, Genk, Gingelom, Gistel, Grimbergen, Grobbendonk, Haaltert, Hamont-Achel, Harelbeke, Heers, 
Heist-op-den-Berg, Herenthout, Herne, Herzele, Hoeilaart, Hoeselt, Holsbeek, Hove, Ichtegem, 
Ieper, Jabbeke, Kampenhout, Kasterlee, Kinrooi, Knokke-Heist, Koksijde, Kontich, Kortenaken, 
Kruibeke, Laakdal, Landen, Langemark-Poelkapelle, Lebbeke, Ledegem, Lier, Lint, Lokeren, 
Londerzeel, Lovendegem, Lubbeek, Lummen, Maaseik, Machelen, Meise, Merchtem, Mortsel, 
Nazareth, Neerpelt, Nevele, Nijlen, Olen, Oosterzele, Opglabbeek, Opwijk, Peer, Putte, Retie, 
Rotselaar, Ruiselede, Schilde, Sint-Katelijne-Waver, Sint-Truiden, Stabroek, Staden, Steenokkerzeel, 
Temse, Tessenderlo, Tielt, Tielt-Winge, Tienen, Tremelo, Turnhout, Vleteren, Waarschoot, Waregem, 
Wellen, Wemmel, Wevelgem, Wichelen, Wielsbeke, Wijnegem, Willebroek, Zaventem, Zedelgem, 
Zele, Zelzate, Zingem, Zoersel, Zomergem and Zulte. 
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15. End notes 
 
                                                        
1 The term „use‟ could imply that somehow the financial information influences decisions or actions 
taken. This aspect falls outside the scope of this article. However, to our knowledge, there is no 
adequate synonym for „use‟ and by using the term we mean the aspect of use referring to the fact that 
councilors (previously) assimilate the information and integrate it in their speech during the budget 
debate, regardless of its impact on the following decisions. Thus, use is defined as „talking about‟. To 
our knowledge, two studies addressed this particular aspect of use (Moynihan 2006, Ter Bogt, van 
Helden, and Van der Kolk, forthcoming), also referring to it as „actual use‟. 
2 Although our research is focused on non-executive local elected representatives (councilors), we start 
our argumentation by describing the specific use pattern of politicians in general, as it strongly differs 
from other user groups. 
3 There are also major differences between application of concepts in private „businesslike‟ 
environments and in the public sector, respectively. 
4 72% of councils in our dataset are coalitions of two or more parties. 
5 Unemployment policy and inhabitants‟ income level, for example, is not in the realm of action of 
cities and municipalities. These policy areas are controlled by the federal government. Some aspects, 
such as activation of unemployed people, are regional matters. The same holds true for inhabitants‟ 
income level (Bastida, Benito, and Guillamón 2009). 
6 The quantitative nature of the budget itself is obviously very conducive to the presence of financial 
information in councilors‟ contributions (see e.g., Frisco and Stalebrink (2008)). Finance directors 
identify financial reporting as the most useful (after accountability to audit offices) tool for elaborating 
on the budget for the next period. German councilors approve the budget and instruct the 
administration based on financial reports  (Adam and Behm 2006). 
7 The authors have extensive working experience in local government. 
8 By focusing on the official budget debate in municipal councils, we exclude the preceding 
negotiations, party meetings or special financial and budget committee sessions. Raudla (2012) 
concluded that in Estonia financial performance was not discussed at meetings of the budget 
committee. Similarly to Flemish municipalities, the Estonian committee only had an advisory role. 
Moreover, the installation of a financial or budget committee is not mandatory in Flanders; the 
number of participants is limited; the meetings are not public and are limited in time. The presence of 
a municipal financial committee does not significantly impact on the occurrence of financial 
information in the debate (Oneway Anova, F. 0.781, p. 0.38). 
9 Balance sheet and operating statements are derived from the budgetary document through a complex 
reconcilement system with economic and functional coding. 
10 These official public documents are a reliable, neutral and objective reproduction of the councils‟ 
meetings. The city manager is responsible for the correctness of the notification. 
11 According to a detailed clustering of municipalities comprising some 150 socio-economic factors. 
12 Our interviewees are neutral observers of the budget debate in the sense that they are civil servants 
with expertise in local budgeting. Two interviewees are city managers responsible for the council‟s 
minutes and are always present during its meetings. One interviewee worked in the cabinet of the 
Ministry of Interior Affairs and another worked for the Flemish Home Office. The fifth interviewee is 
an expert for the Association of Municipalities and Cities. 
13 The budget proposal was approved unanimously in only one of 121 debates studied. 
14 Result of one sample T-test (means) (T 8.186, p.0,000). 
15 Given that our dependent variable is a typically over-dispersed count variable, we performed a 
negative binominal regression with log link (see e.g., Hilbe (2011). Alternatives such as Poisson 
regression models did not fit our data because the variance exceeds the mean (Kutner et al. 2005). Due 
to the limited number of cases with value zero (7), we did not apply the zero inflated variant of the 
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negative binominal regression model.  The omnibus test, testing the model as a whole using the 
likelihood ratio chi² demonstrates that our model is significant (p. 0.000). Analyses of the raw and 
likelihood residuals show that the assumptions to perform negative binominal regression are fulfilled. 
16 Our measure has internal consistency (Cronbach Alpha= 0.74 for the 14 items). 
17 Concerning the selection of variables under study, we opted for a selection of a few specific variables 
because of high correlations between different political (% of votes, share of seats, number of majority 
parties, % votes largest party) and financial variables (municipalities‟ incomes and expenses, debt rate, 
investment rate). In order to assess the robustness of our results, we conducted sensitivity tests with 
alternative variables. Firstly, we performed the analysis on solely the budgetary items as dependent 
variable. Our results remained unchanged. Secondly, we substituted some political and financial 
variables by alternative measures. Property tax rate was replaced by the actual tax revenue (value in € 
for 2011) (p. 0.019). As for the political variables, the dummy coalition/majority was substituted by the 
number of parties in majority (p. 0.032) and by the total number of parties in the council (p. 0.021). 
Our results remained stable throughout the robustness analyses. For reasons of completeness, some 
variables referring to the economic situation in the municipality (unemployment and inhabitants‟ 
income level) were added. Unemployment was not significant (p. 0.79) and the mean inhabitant‟s 
income level was significant (p. 0.071), but correlates with the tax rate. Additionally, we tested for 
interactions between coalition and explanation, explanation and competition, competition and chair 
and explanation and chair. None was significant. 
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STUDY 3: IS IT REALLY (JUST) A MATTER 
OF POLITICS?  
ANALYZING THE INFLUENCE OF LOCAL 
POLITICAL CONDITIONS ON THE LEVEL OF 
SUBSIDIES THAT FLEMISH 
MUNICIPALITIES OBTAIN. 
Abstract 
This study contributes to the need for more profound and integrated studies of individual 
and political characteristics that explain differences in municipalities‟ capacities to attract 
subsidies. The paper quantitatively assesses the impact of local political conditions on the 
level of subsidies that municipalities obtain. In addition, we integrate the „human political 
factor‟ into our analysis, by adding mayors‟ opinions about their role and their view about the 
impact of local political conditions. The paper uses empirical data from a recent inventory of 
subsidy flows by the Vlabest (Flemish advisory council for administrative affairs) combined 
with data from interviews with 11 mayors. The statistical evidence suggests that some 
political factors (e.g., the number of parties in council) and properties related to the mayor 
(his/ her party, and his/her other political mandates) have an impact on the amount of 
subsidies that municipalities obtain. Moreover, mayors position themselves as very relevant 
actors in the process of obtaining subsidies, although their personal engagement differs.  
Key words: subsidies, mayors, political conditions, municipalities. 
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1. Introduction  
One of the dominant concerns of local governments is revenue collection (Petrovsky and 
Avellaneda 2014). In this respect, subsidies are an indispensable source of income for cities 
and municipalities
1
. They represent strategic and financial competitive advantages for local 
governments (Carmeli 2006). For example, Flemish municipalities are strongly dependent 
on the availability of resources to provide public infrastructure (Goeminne and Smolders 
2013). Traditionally, differences between municipalities‟ capacities to obtain those subsidies 
have been explained as a function of contextual, i.e., political, financial, socio-economic and 
cultural factors representing the external constraints and opportunities that they face (Zafra-
Gómez, López-Hernández, and Hernández-Bastida 2009, Bastida, Benito, and Guillamón 
2009). However, the impact of those contextual factors is not univocal, for example the 
impact of political factors is deemed very relevant but is also questioned (Johansson 2003a, 
Sole-Olle 2006, Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro 2008, Bouvet and Dall'Erba 2010, 
Avellaneda 2012b). Especially the local political environment may be very relevant as any 
process of subsidy application starts with a political decision and is preceded by political 
negotiations and bargaining.  
Other explanations stem from the upper echelons theory advocating that the differences 
between municipalities‟ abilities to obtain subsidies should be interpreted trough human 
actions, more specifically by looking at the key figures in organizations (Carmeli 2006, 
Avellaneda 2009a, Avellaneda 2009b, Jurak and Pinteric 2012, Petrovsky and Avellaneda 
2014). In this respect mayors could be very relevant characters. As the most powerful local 
leaders mayors are key–pivotal players in municipalities. Their behavior in relation to 
obtaining subsidies could also explain differences between municipalities. 
Although both research streams have produced many studies, to our knowledge, they did not 
integrate the political contextual and the human perspective into one research setting. 
Analyses of local political conditions may not cover human aspects (for example the role of 
mayors) in the complex process of acquiring subsidies. This study adds mayors‟ opinions 
about their role and their view about the impact of the local political context to the 
quantitative assessment of political conditions. Quantitative analyses of political conditions 
using a recent Vlabest inventory of subsidy flows will thus be complemented with a 
qualitative study containing interviews with mayors
2
. In doing so we contribute to the need 
for more profound and integrated studies of individual and political characteristics that 
explain differences between municipalities with regard to their capacities to attracts 
subsidies.  
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2. Focus on the ‘grantee’s’ side in studying subsidies 
Generally, when assessing the impact of subsidies, the focus has been on the granter, the 
government dividing subsidies. Research in line with public choice theory often explained 
subsidies as an element in the broader distribution movement from higher governmental 
echelons to lower governmental levels, introducing premises such as the flypaper effect and 
vote maximizing behavior
3
.  
When considering the allocation of grants from the viewpoint of the „receiving local 
government‟ i.e. the grantee, the most frequently investigated topics relate to the economic 
impact of attributing grants, for example subsidies‟ influence on local fiscal policy, local 
budget cycles, spending behavior, the realization of own revenues, the role of spatial 
interactions and the effects on employment (Goeminne, Geys, and Smolders 2008, Benito, 
Bastida, and Garcia 2010, Benito, Bastida, and Vicente 2012). Alternative studies examined 
the impact of very specific earmarked grants, for example in the domain of housing or 
garbage collection or on the real estate market (Benito, Bastida, and Garcia 2010). They 
mainly assess the impact of those specific grants applying advanced frontier methods for 
policy sectors with highly measurable output (de Borger et al. 1994). The attraction of 
subsidies from the viewpoint of the local government has, to our knowledge, been studied to 
a lesser extent. 
3. The influence of local political conditions on the obtaining of 
subsidies 
When we start considering which factors could influence the obtaining of subsidies, local 
political conditions occur as the most obvious and relevant. Related studies e.g., in the 
domain of tax collection, demonstrated the impact of context in relation to municipal 
finances and financial performance. They identified political conditions as particularly 
relevant determinants (Bouvet and Dall'Erba 2010, Avellaneda 2012b, Petrovsky and 
Avellaneda 2014). Political elements are decisive in both redistribution mechanisms and for 
the implementation of policy (Krebs and Pelissero, 2010). Simply stated, some political 
contexts simplify the request for subsidies whereas others impede it (Avellaneda, 2012b).  
A first factor relates to the political climate in the council. It is reasonable to assume that 
intra- council constellations help create good environmental conditions for the application 
for subsidies, e.g., as elements in the executing of a strategic planning (Egner and Heinelt 
2008). In this respect, the balance of power in the council is very relevant to support the 
majority‟s plans for subsidy application (Egner and Heinelt 2008). Power relations force 
leaders to mobilize coalitions to support their demands for subsidies (Avellaneda 2009). 
Besides, according to the Weak Government Hypothesis, the more fragmented the 
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government, the higher expenditures, and possibly the higher the need of financial resources 
such as additional grants (Ashworth, Geys, and Heyndels 2005). 
Secondly, intergovernmental relations and the support of other tiers of government influence 
the ability of municipalities to receive grants (Schaap, Daemen, and Ringeling 2009, 
Petrovsky and Avellaneda 2014). Steyvers et al. (2008) confirm that decision-making 
increasingly depends on key-individuals located in different organizations and levels instead 
of hierarchy or power of certain parties. Motives for determining the allocation of 
intergovernmental transfers are sometimes merely political. In this respect overlapping party 
affiliation (party alignment) is the most relevant factor (Johansson 2003a, Avellaneda 2009a, 
Ermini and Santolini 2010, Bouvet and Dall'Erba 2010). Various studies, e.g., Petrovsky and 
Avellaneda (2014) found that municipalities ruled by the same party as their upper- tier 
grantor governments received more grants than unaligned ones.  
A third relevant aspect relates to the local politicians having seat in higher political 
assemblies. For example, in Flanders where political localism prevails, regional executive 
politicians (in our case members of the Flemish parliament) would be in need of local support 
in order to develop their political career
4
. Consequently, some combine their parliamentary 
mandate with a local executive function as mayor or aldermen. Those local politicians have 
direct access to subsidizing ministers and are expected to defend their municipalities‟ interest 
in their parliamentary activities. So politicians who combine their local mandate with a seat 
in the Flemish parliament could be better positioned to obtain subsidies for their 
municipality.  
Fourthly, parties are not only vote seekers but also office and policy makers (Johansson 
2003). Certain parties, e.g., Christian Democrats and socialists are traditionally ruling parties 
with decades of governing experience. In this respect politicians from purely local parties 
could be disadvantaged. They lack the support from a (national) party organization or from 
ministers or MP‟s (members of parliament) who may defend their municipalities‟ interests at 
higher political echelons. 
A final element concerns political experience. Experience is associated with a range of 
technical and interpersonal skills that could be relevant in the process of applying for 
subsidies. More experienced politicians are generally better positioned to be familiar with 
modern policymaking (Buylen and Christiaens 2014). Moreover, experience facilitates 
assimilation of new instruments and procedures among which we could place the application 
for subsidies (Buylen and Christiaens 2014). 
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4. Control factors: socio-economic factors and size 
Besides the impact of political conditions we must reckon that the overall social and 
economic context could be determining for the financial needs of municipalities and thus 
represent „demand indicators‟ in relation to subsidies. In accordance with related studies we 
control for a number of variables describing the socio- economic situation of the 
municipalities (Krebs and Pelissero 2010, Petrovsky and Avellaneda 2014). Economic 
development is generally recognized as a highly significant factor. A stable and comfortable 
financial position is considered as a precondition for developing (new) strategies, e.g., 
submitting new projects for subsidies (Avellaneda 2009a). The municipalities‟ social status 
also influences their need for additional resources. Frequently used indicators are 
inhabitants‟ income level, labor and property taxes, unemployment and demographic factors 
such as young and old population share (de Borger et al. 1994, Johansson 2003a, Seifert and 
Nieswand 2013). Finally, we incorporate size and administrative capacity as control variables 
for organizational complexity (Carmeli 2006).
5
 Size is operationalized through the socio-
economic Belfius clustering of cities and municipalities. The clusters comprise some 150 
factors, of which the scale is a dominating element.  
5. The role of mayors 
Our assessment of political conditions may not capture the „human political factor‟ in the 
acquiring of subsidies. As „upper echelon‟ players, mayors could be very relevant in this 
respect (Avellaneda 2012b). Mayors are often the strongest leaders in the local political scene 
and are deemed responsible for the overall financial health of the municipality, while the 
individual legislator is not (Vallet and De Rynck 2006, Avellaneda 2009a).  
In many countries, mayors‟ role has undergone major transformations the last decade (Rao 
and Berg 2005, Copus 2011). Studies in the area of public administration, governance and 
political science documented that mayors become more prominent leaders, acting as „primus 
inter pares‟ (Borraz and John 2004, Rao and Berg 2005, Satterthwaite 2009, Reynaert et al. 
2010, Steyvers 2013). They are increasingly important characters in the transforming of local 
governments into effective public organizations (Rao and Berg 2005, Steyvers et al. 2006). 
For this purpose mayors are expected to embody the entrepreneurial spirit of their 
municipality and be outward looking for ways to optimize the development and the financial 
position of their locality in an environment of growing competition (Borraz and John 2004, 
Greasley and Stoker 2008).  
While national legislation might provide a framework for their initiatives, mayors need to 
recognize the opportunities with regard to the attraction of subsidies. There is evidence that 
in some cases elected mayors may evolve in the direction of a political and visionary broker, 
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that is, a synthesizer of interests and coalitions who intends to maximize the resources for the 
municipality (Egner and Heinelt 2008, Block and Steyvers 2011, Michel and Taylor 2012, 
Avellaneda 2012b, Steyvers 2013). These mayors embody prominent forms of executive 
leadership because they can pull the shifting framework of local decision-making together 
and act as real entrepreneurs. Due to this entrepreneurial behavior some authors denominate 
to the mayor as the CEO of the municipality (Steyvers et al. 2006).  
This concept of „CEO-isation‟ might refer to elements of entrepreneurship in the private 
sector associated with taking risks and innovativeness (Littunen 2000). Although there is no 
pre-defined set of features, this CEO-isation of mayoralty or the „entrepreneurial mayor‟ is 
characterized by various managerial skills. CEO-like mayors focus more on interconnectivity, 
agenda-setting and network broking than their „traditional‟ counterparts (Gains, John, and 
Stoker 2008, Block and Steyvers 2011). They also emphasize more efficiency than democratic 
aspects, they tend to show more openness toward private-public cooperation, out of house 
production and cooperation in providing services. Important aspects in their behavior are 
stronger horizontal networks, local innovation and capacity building. Their leadership is also 
more individualized, taking office and executive responsibility, challenging traditional task 
divisions as political and administrative leaders in disadvantage of the council (Steyvers et al. 
2008). This CEO-isation also implies a de-collectivization and professionalization of 
leadership with mayors spending much time in office. We could also talk of a more 
„managerial‟ mayor. Some authors stress the de-politization of the entrepreneurial mayors‟ 
role in this respect. For example, Greasley and Stoker (2008) do not talk about 
entrepreneurialism but prefer to label it as facilitative styles of local political leadership that 
is visible and outward looking, but particularly less partisan than more established forms. 
Those established forms are associated with a „traditional outlook‟ and „classic‟ roles (e.g., 
importance of services rendered) with which a considerable group of mayors still identifies 
(Steyvers et al. 2006).  
However, the issue is that there is not much empirical evidence about mayors‟ role in the 
attraction of subsidies. Can this CEO-isation of mayoralty, identified in specific cases, such as 
urban planning projects be generalized in relation to subsidies attraction in local 
government? In fact, there is ample evidence that politicians do not always take up a strategic 
policy making or even entrepreneurial role associated with „new‟ types of local governance. 
Being outward looking for strategic opportunities for the municipality indeed requires an 
important shift in role orientation from an operational focus to strategic policy planning. 
Although this new policy oriented role has been widely proposed in various local government 
modernization movements, politicians still face difficulties holding on to this idea (Hansen 
2001, Liguori, Sicilia, and Steccolini 2009, Stocker and Thompson-Fawcett 2014).  
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Moreover, there could be differences related to the underlying subsidy process itself. 
Entrepreneurial mayors have essentially been characterized by cooperation with various 
private partners. However, with regards to attracting subsidies from other governmental 
layers, political connections could be more relevant, for example belonging to the same party 
as the subsidizing minister. The application for governmental subsidies could also require 
more internal cooperation with civil servants and other (sometimes competing) political 
representatives. This could demand a de-politization of the entrepreneurship model in which 
mayors primarily take up a bridging function. We are not able to integrate those aspects of 
mayors‟ role or entrepreneurial behavior directly into our quantitative analyses of local 
political conditions, but the interview findings enrich the results of the quantitative analyses. 
Based on the mayors‟ testimonies in the interviews, a first element will thus be to clear up the 
role of mayors in applications for subsidies. In addition we present their opinions about the 
influence of local political conditions on the obtaining of subsidies. Figure 1 summarizes our 
research approach.  
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Figure 1: Research design  
  
POLITICAL CONDITIONS: 
*fragmentation (parties in council) 
*party mayor 
*combination mandates (mayor or aldermen MP) 
*political experience mayor (years mayoralty) 
 
CONTROL: 
*municipal cluster (Belfius clustering) 
*administrative capacity (personnel/1000 
inhabitants) 
*demography (share young and old people) 
*social position (unemployment, average 
income) 
*financial position (debt/inhabitant, value 
property tax) 
QUALITATIVE STUDY: Mayors‟ role in attracting 
subsidies & opinions about political conditions 
Level of subsidies (4 computations,-codes in table 5) 
Recurrent (code A) 
Non-recurrent (code B) 
Recurrent & non-recurrent (code C) 
Selection of 29 specific flows (code D) 
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6. Flemish municipalities 
There are four levels of government in Flanders: the central government, the regions, the 
provinces and 308 municipalities. Municipalities have wide ranging budgetary autonomy and 
are authorized to decide independently about expenditure and revenues. Unlike other 
countries (UK and US) with different forms of government, Flemish municipalities all have 
identical organizational forms, i.e. a parliamentary system with a fixed electoral cycle of 6 
years.  
The mayor and aldermen together constitute the executive board of the municipality. 
Although the council is in principle considered as the heart of the local political institutions, 
in practice the executive board is pre-eminent (Verhelst, Reynaert, and Steyvers 2011). In 
their own perception but also in reality, the mayor is the political leader of the majority and 
thus chief policy maker. Officially mayors have only limited authority but mayoral leadership 
is relatively strong, dominating the council and the administration. However, some authors 
categorize Flemish mayors more as collegial leaders (Ackaert 2005, Egner and Heinelt 2008). 
Flemish mayors consider themselves as rather traditional policymakers, leaders of political 
institutions and lobbyists (Rao and Berg 2005). In their relations with citizens, they position 
themselves much more as coordinators oriented towards general policy issues (Ackaert 
2005). Theoretically Flemish mayors can be located somewhat „between‟ the traditional 
parochial style and the NPM-inspired entrepreneurial role, although this more traditional 
style is slowly being replaced by a new type of leadership that emphasizes policy-making and 
some aspects of entrepreneurship (Ackaert 2005, Steyvers et al. 2006).  
Concerning their political activities, Flemish mayors devote considerable part of their energy 
to maintaining their networks (Rodenbach, Steyvers, and Reynaert 2013). They aim to link 
the citizens to local government and often run as go-between between several authorities, 
groups and policy networks (Schaap, Daemen, and Ringeling 2009). Many combine different 
political positions, often serving as members of the regional or provincial council. More than 
80% of all MP‟s (regional and federal) combine their parliamentary seat with a local 
mandate, 19% of the members of the Flemish parliament is mayor (Rodenbach, Steyvers, and 
Reynaert 2013). This combination of mandates refers to the role of mayors as lobbyers, who 
are expected to obtain projects and to mobilize funds for their municipality. Multiple office 
holding, which provides local politicians direct access to ministers and MP‟s, is considered as 
the appropriate instrument to realize this.  
Concerning Flemish municipalities‟ financial position, they face important financial 
challenges due to factors such as the global economic crisis, ageing, pension pays and 
dropping dividend revenues from the energy sector (Belfius 2013). So additional grants and 
subsidies are particularly welcome. Successive rounds of Belgian state reform have turned the 
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regional government today into the most important government from the local point of view 
(Wayenberg 2005). Grants from regional government are almost equally important as 
taxation for local governments‟ revenues. 19.3% of municipalities‟ investments are financed 
through grants so they constitute an important revenue source for the Flemish local 
governments (Goeminne and Smolders 2013).  
7. Data collection 
The data collection follows our double research intentions. For the assessment of local 
political conditions on the level of subsidies we analyze recent empirical material from a 
Vlabest (2013) study. In 2013, the Vlabest listed the different subsidy flows from the Flemish 
regional government to local governments. The subsidies are earmarked i.e., designed for 
specific purposes. The study identified 68 streams, with important differences between policy 
sectors (e.g., 1 grant scheme for the finance and budget department and 12 for housing and 
planning). Subsidies can be either recurrent or non- recurrent. Recurrent subsidies are 
attributed regularly (often yearly) while non-recurrent subsidies represent occasional project 
oriented subsidies. In our study, 43 are labeled as „recurrent‟ while the remaining 26 
represent the non-recurrent, occasional subsidies. On average municipalities receive 
subsidies from 14 recurrent grants flows, mostly between 11 and 15 grants, with a maximum 
of 27 and minimum of 3. Table 5 in the appendix presents the different subsidy types that we 
analyze. 
It is important to notice that the listed subsidy flows represent about one fourth of all 
subsidies attributed to local governments by the Flemish government (the other three 
quarters are attributed through the „cities‟ and municipalities‟ funding according to a detailed 
system of distribution criteria, this is not earmarked). This „cities and municipalities funding‟ 
is a typical example of an equalizing subsidy, aiming at reducing the (financial) differences 
between cities and municipalities. The funds are attributed automatically based on fixed 
criteria. The role of contextual elements such as political conditions or the mayor is therefore 
expected to be restricted in this respect.  Data availability limited the data collection to a one 
year period, grants attributed or registered in 2011, but we may presume that the subsidy 
streams are rather stable
6
. Our data thus indicate how much earmarked grants each 
municipality obtains from the Flemish government
7
.  
However, as already stated, the political decision-making process could be more complex 
than the quantitative data may comprehend. While assessing the impact of political 
conditions, the role of mayors remains largely uncovered in the statistical part. To add this 
dimension to our study, we gathered data from 11 semi-structured interviews with mayors. 
Criteria to select interviewees were: level of subsidies of their municipality, socio-economic 
profile of their municipality, political experience, province and political party. The 
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respondents were identified after deliberations with an expert panel
8
. As such, they represent 
a varied group of mayors and cover the different political conditions under which they 
operate. A consequence of this selection is that most interviewees belong to cities and 
municipalities that obtain rather more than the average amount of subsidies.  
Interviews lasted between 45 minutes and 1, 5 hours. The questions concerned their role in 
the processes of obtaining subsidies and their opinion about the impact of political conditions 
such as the influence of their own party, the number of parties in council and the relevance of 
combining multiple political mandates for obtaining subsidies. To counter the social 
desirability bias in mayors‟ answers as much as possible, we asked for detailed facts about 
recent subsidy applications. We requested to describe the latest subsidy processes (e.g., 
mayors‟ specific actions or initiatives in this respect, the timing of the process, the role of the 
different actors, discussions in the college, … ). Additionally, we compared mayors‟ 
testimonies with available background information (mayors‟ political career, former (non-
political) experience, portfolio as aldermen, party‟s position in the council, power relations in 
their council, mayors‟ education and mayors‟ network. This material is publicly available on 
political parties‟ and municipalities‟ websites, or stems from other sources such as the local 
profiles issued by the Flemish government.   
8. Empirical model 
The discussed political and control factors are regressed (OLS regression) on the amount of 
subsidies
9
. The variables used for the analyses are presented in table 3 in the appendix.  
Because the dependent variables (the computations of the amount of subsidies) are not 
normally distributed, we performed a log transformation to meet the requirements for OLS 
regression. To avoid possible issues of endogeneity between some control variables and the 
dependent variables, for example the obtaining of subsidies could affect the debt or tax rates, 
we integrated a one-year time delay in our measurement (we used control variables of the 
year 2010 while the subsidies were attributed in 2011 (or paid out even later)).  
Concerning the dependent variable, the level of grants, we computed 4 variants of the subsidy 
flow
10
. We distinguish between recurring and non-recurring subsidies. Recurring subsidies 
require a „recognition‟ but are afterwards attributed yearly. Contrastingly, non- recurring, 
occasional subsidies (co)finance specific projects or investments for a limited time period. To 
obtain them, special efforts are required (e.g., writing applications and project plans, 
cooperation between different organizations, co-financing). We have three dependent 
variables computed with both recurring and non-recurring subsidies. The first contains the 
recurring and non-recurrent subsidies all education subsidies excluded (Code A in the tables 
1, 2 and 5) 
11
. The second includes only recurrent subsidies (Code B). The third is composed 
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of solely thematic non-recurring subsidies (Code C). In addition, we selected 29 subsidy flows 
(recurring and non-recurring) to which all municipalities are entitled. Theoretically all 308 
municipalities may apply for these 29 subsidy schemes. Frequencies indicate that only 6 
municipalities did not obtain at least one of the 29 subsidy flows. This is our fourth 
dependent variable (Code D). 
Full description of variables is provided in table 2 (appendix) and the results of the statistical 
testing are grouped in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Regression results 
 
 Level subsidies 
(ln)  
 
 
Total recurrent 
and non-
recurrent 
subsidies (excl. 
education) (code 
A) 
Total recurrent 
subsidies  
(code B) 
Non-recurrent  
subsidies  
(code C) 
Selection 
subsidies  
(code D) 
Political conditions     
Parties in council  0.165 (2.711)***  0.220 (4.425)***  0.085 (1.138)  0.100 (2.032) 
Mayor  MP  0.123 (0.584)***  0.091 (2.098)**  0.072 (0.340)  0.121 (0.338)** 
Aldermen MP  0.026 (-0.385)  0.030 (0.686)  0.021 (-0.486)  0.020 (-0.342) 
Experience mayor 
Years mayoralty 
-0.016 (0.139)  0.000 (0.012) -0.029 (0.202) -0.019 (0.407) 
Mayor Liberal 
party 
 0.006 (-3.377) -0.035 (-0.785)  0.013 (-1.436)  0.025 (-2.334) 
Mayor Local party -0.153 (0.509)*** -0.078 (-1.793)* -0.091 (-0.775) -0.140 (0.561)** 
Mayor Socialist   0.023 (2.711) -0.048 (-1.082) -0.050 (1.138)  0.034 (2.032) 
Control factors     
Value property tax  -0.076 (-1.044)  0.076 (1.076)  0.009 (0.090) -0.147 (-1.526) 
Debt/inhabitant   0.095 (1.891)*  0.010 (0.217)  0.059 (0.837)  0.081 (1.229) 
Unemployment  -0.011 (-0.158) -0.010 (-0.153)  0.012 (0.124)  0.052 (0.588) 
Average 
income/inhabitant 
-0.018 (-0.229)  0.121 (1.597) 0 .006 (0.056)  0.080 (0.766) 
Share young people -0.041 (-0.718) -0.029 (-0.526)  0.041 (0.508)  0.037 (0.490) 
Share old people -0.037 (-0.574) -0.130 (-2.113)** -0.051 (-0.576) -0.012 (-0.144) 
Personnel/1000 
inhabitants 
 0.096 (1.490)  0.160 (2.570)**  0.086 (0.955)  0.093 (1.089) 
Belfius Cluster V1 -0.109 (-1.537)  0.027 (0.396) -0.169 (-1.702)* -0.086 (-0.916) 
Belfius Cluster V2 -0.066 (-1.098)  0.032 (0.547) -0.009 (-0.112)  0.004 (0.052) 
Belfius Cluster V3 -0.019 (-0.288) -0.116 (-1.795)  0.008 (0.081)  0.019 (0.210) 
Belfius Cluster V4  0.034 (0.645) -0.004 (-0.081) -0.031 (-0.412)  0.068 (0.967) 
Belfius Cluster V5  0.161 (2.737)***  0.181 (3.187)***  0.047 (0.572)  0.085 (1.095) 
Belfius Cluster V6 -0.070 (-1.279) -0.042 (-0.807) -0.090 (-1.180) -0.062 (-0.863) 
Belfius Cluster V7  0.118 (2.134)*  0.171 (3.212)***  0.006 (0.077)  0.032 (0.434) 
Belfius Cluster V8  0.053 (1.078)  0.060 (1.255)  0.001 (0.011)  0.023 (0.352) 
Belfius Cluster V9 -0.086 (-1.453) -0.107 (-1.881)*  0.001 (0.013) -0.010 (-0.134) 
Belfius Cluster V10  0.066 (1.027)  0.100 (1.622) -0.108 (-1.216)  0.006 (0.073) 
Belfius Cluster V11 -0.080 (-1.089)  0.054 (0.755) -0.079 (-0.770) -0.066 (-0.680) 
Belfius Cluster V13  0.078 (1.544) -0.010 (-0.208) -0.004 (-0.060)  0.057 (0.865) 
Belfius Cluster V14  0.296 (5.593)***  0.216 (4.243)***  0.139 (1.882)*  0.190 (2.724)*** 
Belfius Cluster V15  0.333 (6.022)***  0.336 (6.312)***  0.132 (1.716)*  0.206 (2.829)*** 
Belfius Cluster V16  0.034 (0.439) -0.009 (-0.121) -0.004 (-0.033)  0.071 (0.689) 
     
N 295 295 295 295 
R² /adj. R² 0.57/0.52 0.60/0.56 0.16/0.07 0.25/0.17 
Anova F 12.14 *** 13.84*** 1.78** 3.12*** 
Max. VIF 3.85 3.85 3.79 3.84 
T-values in parenthesis /  Standardized coefficients 
Spearman correlations max. 0.42 (between Belfius cluster V1 and average income/inhabitant) 
*10% sign, **5%sign, ***1% sign. 
 Details about content of codes are provided in table 5 (appendix) 
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9. Statistical results 
9.1 Influence of political conditions 
We note from the R² values that the two most comprehensive subsidy flows (codes A and B) 
are better explained by the explanatory variables than the other computations (non-recurrent 
and selected subsidies). Maybe because in the latter some major recurring subsidy flows are 
omitted and the mass of subsidies to be explained is reduced.  
Overall, our findings support the idea that political conditions influence municipalities‟ 
capacity to attract grants. They validate the theory that differences in the local political 
conditions manifest themselves in variances in subsidy collection. The most significant 
positive factors are the number of parties in council and mayors‟ membership of the Flemish 
parliament. Compared to the reference category of Christian Democrats, mayors of local 
parties are negatively predisposed. Mayors‟ political experience and the presence of an 
alderman who is member of the Flemish parliament have no significant impact.  
The number of parties in council has a positive effect on 2 of the 4 computations of the 
subsidy stream. As a rule, the more parties in the council, the more subsidies municipalities 
obtain, although this does not hold for the recurrent and selected subsidies. This means that 
the Weak Government Hypothesis stating that more political fragmentation demands more 
resources (and more subsidies?) can be partially accepted. The necessity to fulfill the 
expectations of different coalition partners or to satisfy the fragmented opposition may 
demand more income from subsidies. 
As expected, municipalities with mayors member of the Flemish parliament have an 
advantageous position to obtain Flemish subsidies, although this does not hold for the non-
recurrent subsidies. Probably those „MP- mayors‟ have inside information (e.g., about new 
plans or subsidizing initiatives). Due to their closeness to ministers, MP‟s and cabinet 
advisers they keep more up to date about financial grants. Presumably their seat in „Brussels‟ 
enables them to closely follow and monitor the money flows. However, we should be cautious 
in interpreting the results. The question remains why it is not the case for non-recurrent 
subsidies (do these municipalities get along without additional project funding or are these 
subsidies attributed differently ?). Moreover, there are not many reflections of the Flemish 
coalition at local level so the political alignment between the Flemish parliament and 
municipalities is rather limited (Olislagers and Steyvers 2014).  
In contrast with previous findings about the positive impact of experience, our analyses 
reveal no significant influence of  mayors‟ political experience. Indeed, due to data limitation 
we could only include formal political experience. It is plausible that other aspects of practice 
such as education or business experience are more relevant (Buylen and Christiaens 2014)? 
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Or otherwise that more experienced mayors are not necessarily the most active ones or those 
who engage in subsidy applications. 
Concerning the impact of mayors‟ political party, it seems that municipalities with mayors 
belonging to local parties obtain significantly less subsidies, in comparison to the Christian 
Democrats. Municipalities with socialist or liberal mayors are not significantly advantaged or 
disadvantaged compared to the reference category of Christian democrats. Indeed, Christian 
democrats have a governing tradition with decades of experience and an elaborate network of 
(former) ministers and cabinet personnel. Maybe mayors from local parties miss the 
interaction with party members or the lack of support from a political apparatus? In fact, 
municipalities with mayors from local parties are the only ones that are affected by party. 
There are no significant differences between municipalities with mayors from other 
„traditional‟ parties. This could point at the fact that governing experience makes the 
difference. However, we should keep in mind that the group of local parties is quite 
heterogeneous; sometimes they are supported by national parties
12
. Some local lists are 
composed of national and local figures, although they are essentially focused on local themes 
(Heyerick and Steyvers 2013).  
All in all, some political conditions either positively or negatively affect subsidies although 
not the non-recurrent ones. In terms of their impact, when we compare the standardized 
coefficients, the number of parties in council seems to be most positively influential. Having a 
mayor from a local party has a significantly negative impact, but the coefficient is lower
13
. 
Concerning the control factors, the fiscal, economic and social variables (tax value, debt rate, 
income and unemployment) are not significant
14
. Demographic factors are only marginally 
influential (the share of old people has a negative effect, but only for recurrent grants). 
Administrative capacity has a slightly positive impact, but also only for recurrent subsidies
15
. 
Finally, it is clear that urbanization and scale positively affect the obtaining of subsidies. 
Municipalities belonging to the Belfius clusters V14 (regional cities) and V15 (large and 
regional cities) obtain significantly more subsidies compared to the reference category of V12 
(rural municipalities). This is also the case for the municipalities in clusters V7 (strongly 
urbanized conglomerate municipalities) and V5 (medium-sized cities) but only for recurrent 
and non-recurrent subsidies and recurrent subsidies (codes A and B). These results show that 
regional, medium-sized and large municipalities obtain significantly more subsidies in 
comparison with their rural counterparts. The coefficients demonstrate that belonging to 
cluster V14 or V15 is even the strongest influential factor, together with the number of parties 
in council. This advantage for larger municipalities is in line with various related studies. 
Larger municipalities are usually better informed, with more administrative capacity to 
manage applications for subsidies. According to some authors in larger cities councilors even 
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face more demands from constituents (Carmeli 2006, Krebs and Pelissero 2010). As a rule, 
larger local authorities are expected to perform better from a financial point of view 
(Petrovsky and Avellaneda 2014).  
9.2 Evidence from interviews: mayors’ role description in subsidy processes 
We begin this section by describing how mayors portray their role and tasks in applications 
for subsidies. All 11 mayors state that they are well informed about subsidies for their 
municipality and they referred to examples of recent achievements. They emphasize the need 
to collect subsidies in order to fund operations and public services, through which they can 
identify and position themselves as policy makers. Mayors recognize the strategic and 
political relevance of subsidies that sometimes determine the quality and the level of services 
they are able to provide. Mayors testify that beyond merely financial support, the „side effects‟ 
of applying for subsidies are at least as relevant. Especially project subsidies are catalysts for 
organizational dynamic offering legitimization to political projects. So the majority of the 
mayors use their strategic (and moral) authority to support and strengthen initiatives to 
obtain subsidies. Mayor 7: “When I get involved in a project, I really throw myself into it 
and it starts to boom”.   
However, mayors must first earn respect and recognition. In this respect the obtaining of 
additional financial means is very relevant. Mayor 11: “Yes, I am a strong and powerful 
figure but I had to earn my authority”. Table 4 illustrates in general terms how the 11 mayors 
portray their involvement in subsidy applications. It is clear that some mayors really identify 
themselves through these actions for additional funding while others prefer to keep more 
distance.  
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Table 4: mayors’ role description in the subsidy process 
Mayor  Role description Actions- behavior 
1 Extremely active, key-figure, driver 
behind many initiatives,  essential 
aspect of mayoralty 
Writes applications, coordinates and monitors 
implementation, planning and execution 
2 Less involved in subsidy applications Uses political network to help administration, 
essentially in case of problems or complications  
3 Stays informed about subsidies, but 
from a certain distance, more passive 
role 
Does not intervene in practice 
4 Public entrepreneur, manager of the 
„public scene‟, strong involvement, 
brings people and ideas together 
Sees opportunities, active when others are not, 
uses inside information for large projects, 
mobilizes network  
5 Wants to be kept informed but focuses 
only on some specific cases 
Relies on administration and college 
6 Less active, more facilitative role Trusts and relies on administration, intervenes 
only to fasten process of obtaining subsidies 
7 Active, but only for larger and 
important projects, less active in other 
cases 
Trusts the administrative staff, but tries to create 
support for projects and subsidy applications 
8 Very active and involved, „more do than 
think‟ person, 
Strong operational focus, very present and 
supervising focus, uses mayoral authority  
9 Active but more supporting role, coach Focus on public works (also in portfolio), very 
limited operational activities 
10 Monitors applications very closely, acts 
as catalyst and mediator 
Considers subsidies and projects as initiatives to 
solve municipality‟s problems, recruits specific 
staff for subsidies 
11 Very active, accelerator and strong 
driving force behind projects, 
entrepreneurial character „a man with a 
plan‟ 
Stimulates subsidies as stepping stone to realize 
bigger projects 
 
Mayors‟ actions in subsidy processes are a combination of operational and strategic activities. 
7 mayors restrict themselves to monitoring and supporting applications from a certain 
distance while 4 others are operationally involved. Indeed, the administration-politics 
interface is perhaps less complex at local government. This means that, if they choose so, 
mayors have the possibility to „intervene operationally‟. This is often encouraged by demands 
from their voters (Steyvers et al. 2006). So their task and job interpretation might diverge, 
but mayors share the same concerns and responsibilities with respect to the attraction of 
subsidies for their municipality. 
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9.3 The impact of political factors according to mayors 
We present mayors‟ opinions about the impact of the political factors that we previously 
assessed quantitatively. We asked their opinion about the impact of parties in council, 
combining different political mandates, political experience and the influence of their party 
on the attraction of subsidies. 
Political fragmentation- parties in council 
10 mayors emphasized that a stable and large majority contributes to a favorable climate for 
subsidy application. Only 1 mayor testified that working with a very tight majority generated 
more dynamism between the seating parties. 
Regardless of the number of parties in council, all mayors stressed the importance of a good 
understanding between college members. College members share a common interest and as 
mayor 2 said: “What is good for the majority, is also good for the mayor”. Mayors‟ role in 
the college is to make the college work as a team, while respecting the checks and balances 
between the members and the parties they represent. The obtaining of subsidies can enhance 
the understanding between college members; it legitimizes the decisions of the majority and 
represents strategic advantages towards the opposition. As mayor 2 stated: “Who can 
continue to be against a project if we receive additional funding?”. Although most mayors 
stimulate initiatives from the college members, they maintain a directing and supervising 
role, clearly acting as „first among equals‟.  
The formal power of their party, in terms of seats or vote share was less relevant. Strong 
opposition even keeps them alert in some cases, as mayor 4 stated:  “In a good competition 
you do not compete against weak opponents”. They also mentioned that coalitions are more 
complex to manage but that the (financial) responsibilities are spread over different parties. 
They experienced that a powerful party might facilitate some processes for subsidy 
application, although 7 mayors thought that their prestige and moral authority even 
represented more power.  
Mayors’ membership of the Flemish parliament 
Only one mayor was member of Flemish parliament at the time of the interview, but others 
had ample political experience either as former minister or as member of different assemblies 
(federal, regional or provincial). 7 mayors considered their job as a full time occupation and 
were rather negative and skeptic about their cumulating colleagues. Mayor 7 puts it this way: 
“Either you are an absent mayor or a very poorly performing member of parliament”.  In 
their opinion, it is not necessary to be in „Brussels‟ if you can rely on other party members to 
defend your interests at crucial moments. Presence in the Flemish parliament is certainly not 
deemed essential, as mayor 4 testified: “No mayor will ever get more subsidies for his 
municipality because he or she is a member of parliament. You really must be an 
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authoritative and respected parliamentarian in order to play a significant role in the 
Flemish parliament and to acquire advantages for your municipality, otherwise you get 
crumbs”. However, they recognized that a network of people who can foster or monitor 
applications for subsidies is particularly useful.  
Although we did not find much support for the idea of combining political mandates, we 
cannot overlook the fact that 3 mayors had a more nuanced view. In their opinion combining 
mandates might be time-consuming but in smaller municipalities the combination should be 
easier to manage. Especially if they belong to the majority in parliament, such a direct link to 
the Flemish government can foster their demands for subsidies. They also think that the 
Flemish parliament needs members familiar with local issues, especially with regards to local 
finances. 
One strongly divergent opinion came from the mayor who is currently having seat in the 
parliament. This mayor strongly defends the combination of mandates and considers the job 
in the parliament essential to lobby for the municipality in the context of Flemish-local 
relations. This mayor advocates the closeness to the apex of power and the accessibility of 
ministers and cabinets as crucial advantages in relation to the obtaining of subsidies.  
Mayors’ political experience 
Of the 11 mayors, 9 had experience as aldermen in different policy areas. In addition, 5 of 
them previously worked in other political assemblies (e.g., provincial council) or in 
ministerial cabinets. Experienced mayors consider this experience as essential to broaden 
their perspective about their municipalities‟ opportunities for resource expansion. During 
their mayoralty they closely monitor those policy areas for which they were responsible as 
aldermen. Mayor 6: “As alderman, I have been responsible for urban development for years 
and it still remains one of my primary concerns”. 
Of the two non-experienced mayors, one regarded this as a strong disadvantage while the 
other could rely on relevant professional expertise. 
Mayors’ opinion about their party’s role 
Our interviewees did not support the proposition that certain parties would be advantaged to 
obtain more subsidies than others, despite the fact that 10 mayors stressed the vital 
importance of their party‟s network. They positioned the role of their party in the „back office‟ 
providing support, education and facilitating contacts between politicians but also between 
politicians and civil servants. Mayor 2: “I really get a lot of information from the party, 
especially from committees where all mayors, aldermen and party group leaders are 
present”. However, 4 mayors nuanced this relevance of their party. They stated that many 
contacts outside the party are equally important; that the party is mainly to make processes 
go more smoothly and that the party does not always bring the right decisions or solutions to 
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problems. Mayor 8: “I am sometimes disappointed about the lack of solidarity in my party”. 
One mayor strongly disagreed with the impact of party politics when applying for subsidies: 
Mayor 1: “We are a purely local party, so the impact of parties in our applications for 
subsidies is extremely limited”. 
To realize their municipalities‟ strategy and policy intentions, mayors often have to cooperate 
impartially and collegially with other powerful actors or bodies (Egner and Heinelt 2008). 
Various mayors confirmed that contacts with other parties are essential for resource 
expansion, to build strategic alliances, to create cooperation between municipalities and to 
foster the understanding between college members. Mayor 11: “The party is important, but I 
must have many other contacts and I cannot allow myself to cocoon in my own party”. 
10. Conclusion 
The mayors‟ testimonies about their role in the obtaining of subsidies demonstrate that some 
mayors really act as entrepreneurial, facilitative and managerial individuals. These mayors 
stress the importance of networks (also outside their own party) and the interconnectivity 
with college members for the attraction of subsidies. Subsidy applications indeed require 
more internal cooperation than collaboration with external partners. This often demands 
strong presence in the municipality and operational involvement. Entrepreneurial mayors act 
as strategic initiators vis à vis the local administration. They are able to detect streams of 
opportunities and turn them into strategic advantages (translated into subsidies) for their 
municipality. They have the capacity and the authority to mobilize and focus fragmented 
actors in the direction of application for subsidies.  
However, a smaller group of mayors chooses a more backbench position and prefers to 
delegate to civil servants. 
Their opinions about the impact of political conditions in their municipality are somehow 
divergent but generally speaking personal aspects as moral authority, political experience, 
and openness for cooperation are esteemed more relevant in the process of obtaining 
subsidies than the formal political constellation. 
11. Discussion  
This study assessed the impact of some local political conditions on the subsidy flow to 
Flemish municipalities. In addition, mayors were interviewed about their role and their 
opinion about the influence of those political conditions. Mayors‟ testimonies diverge in some 
ways from the large scale statistical results. A general observation is that the quantitative 
analyses focused on the impact of some political variables whereas the mayors testified of a 
more de-politicized role where personal reputation and authority are particularly relevant. 
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Some mayors also stated to be more attentive for thematic short term project subsidy 
applications, although statistical analyses do not support this. We also found no statistically 
significant effect of political experience on the subsidy flow, although mayors tend to 
contradict this finding. Should experience be operationalized by more general political and 
managerial skills rather than as years spent as councilor or aldermen? Maybe the differences 
between mayors‟ experience are not explicit enough, as most mayors can rely on several years 
spent in the council or the college.  
Political conditions such as the number of parties in council, mayors‟ membership of the 
Flemish parliament and belonging to a local party have a statistically significant effect on the 
subsidies that municipalities obtain. This is in line with previous studies about resource 
expansion. However, when talking to mayors, other aspects appear as more relevant for 
mayors‟ actions in applications for subsidies.  
How can these differences about the role of political conditions be explained? 
Firstly, although we clearly asked for factual evidence we cannot ignore the fact that mayors‟ 
answers could be somewhat biased by social desirability. Nevertheless, this limitation can be 
dealt with by more triangulation of data and use of „neutral information‟ e.g., by studying 
documents (for example parliamentary documents such as interpellations from mayors in 
parliament) or by interviewing other, non-political, key figures in municipalities.  
Secondly, some local political aspects remain uncovered. For instance, in smaller 
municipalities the role of aldermen could be less powerful, giving more room to the mayor.  
Another aspect is the positive impact of urbanization and size on the subsidy flow. 
Organizational factors, not yet identified but connected with size, clearly have a strong 
positive impact on the obtaining of subsidies. Because we combined different data, we are not 
able to establish exactly how political circumstances influence mayors‟ actions concerning 
subsidies as suggested by Avellaneda (2012a). Indeed, mayors can only function within the 
institutional structures, societal needs and party political constellations of their municipality 
(Steyvers et al., 2006, Avellaneda, 2012b). For example, as Schaap, Daemen, and Ringeling 
(2009) suggest, strong municipal managers might reduce the relevance of mayor. As the 
quest for additional financial resources will most certainly continue to be an essential aspect 
of mayors‟ work, it is certainly worth exploring under which organizational conditions 
mayors can flourish and fully play out their entrepreneurial role. In other words, which 
conditions generate the mayors‟ bonus in relation to obtaining subsidies? Following 
Petrovsky and Avellaneda (2014) this could be linked to the factors that favor local capacity 
building in terms of human, organizational or institutional development. In this respect the 
impact of spatial interactions could also be taken into account (Johansson 2003b, Ermini 
and Santolini 2010). 
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To end with, our interviews uncovered some other aspects of politicians‟ job interpretation. 
The mayors‟ involvement in subsidy processes demonstrate once more the dominance of 
executive politicians over non-executive (Buylen and Christiaens 2014). That the division 
between political-strategic and administrative-operational tasks does not hold in practice has 
been demonstrated before (see e.g., Liguori, Sicilia, and Steccolini (2009)) but is confirmed 
in relation to attracting subsidies as internal strategic process. Both mayors and the 
administration take up operational and strategic tasks. In the case of subsidy attraction, the 
political-administrative tandem is often pulled by the mayor although in their opinion the 
obtaining of grants is to a lesser extent (just) a matter of politics.  
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12. Appendix 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
  N Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES (LN.)           
Total recurrent & non recurrent (excl. 
education) (Code A) 
295 11.71 18.01 14.39 0.85 
Total recurrent (Code B) 295 11.03 19.43 14.84 1.02 
Total non- recurrent (Code C) 295 5.78 16.59 12.85 1.84 
Selection subsidies (Code D) 295 6.24 17.83 13.36 1.52 
       
INDEPENDENT CONTINUOUS VARIABLES       
Parties in council 295 2.00 6.00 4.17 1.07 
Years mayoralty 295 0.00 48.00 10.87 7.59 
Value property tax 2010 295 6.00 52.00 19.17 7.62 
Debt/inhabitant 2010 295 0.00 5335.00 1072.17 606.76 
Unemployment  295 2.10 14.10 5.28 1.70 
Average income/inhabitant 2010 295 11959.00 23511.00 16798.60 1775.90 
Share young people 295 25.67 46.72 37.14 3.42 
Share elderly 295 20.70 54.15 30.69 4.51 
Personnel/1000 inhabitants 295 2.53 17.47 6.95 2.08 
      
INDEPENDENT DUMMY VARIABLES N Frequency %   
Mayor member Flemish Parliament 295 32 10.8%   
Aldermen member Flemish Parliament 295 26 8.8%   
Party mayor Christian Democrats, Ecologists 
(2) and 1 nationalist mayor 
295 153 51.9%   
Party mayor Liberal 295 40 13.6%   
Party mayor Local party 295 77 26.1%   
Party mayor Socialist 295 25 8.5%   
Belfius Cluster V1 295 25 8.5%   
Belfius Cluster V2 295 24 8.1%   
Belfius Cluster V3 295 24 8.1%   
Belfius Cluster V4 295 20 6.8%   
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Belfius Cluster V5 295 24 8.1%   
Belfius Cluster V6 295 20 6.8%   
Belfius Cluster V7 295 20 6.8%   
Belfius Cluster V8 295 8 2.7%   
Belfius Cluster V9 295 25 8.5%   
Belfius Cluster V10 295 15 5.1%   
Belfius Cluster V11 295 14 4.7%   
Belfius Cluster V12 295 34 11.5%   
Belfius Cluster V13 295 12 4.1%   
Belfius Cluster V14 295 8 2.7%   
Belfius Cluster V15 295 6 2.0%   
Belfius Cluster V16 295 8 2.7%   
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Table 3: Variables in the analysis 
 References Variables-Measure 
Political 
factors 
Johansson 2003a, Ashworth, 
Geys, and Heyndels 2005, 
Egner and Heinelt 2008, 
Avellaneda 2009b, Schaap, 
Daemen, and Ringeling 
2009, Bouvet and Dall'Erba 
2010, Krebs and Pelissero 
2010, Petrovsky and 
Avellaneda 2014, Ermini and 
Santolini 2010, Avellaneda 
2012b, Avellaneda 2012a, 
Buylen and Christiaens 2014   
- Parties in council (2006-2012) 
-Dummy mayor member Flemish parliament (0= not 
member, 1= member) (2004-2014) 
-Dummy aldermen member Flemish parliament  (0= not 
member, 1=member) (2004-2014) 
-Party mayor (Christian Democrats, Ecologists and 
nationalists as reference category ) (2006-2012)   
- Political experience mayors (years of mayoralty in 2012) 
 
Control 
factors 
de Borger et al. 1994, 
Johansson 2003a, 
Avellaneda 2009b, Krebs and 
Pelissero 2010, Petrovsky 
and Avellaneda 2014  
- Value 100 surcharges property tax (2010) 
- % unemployment (2011) 
-Debt / inhabitant (2010) 
-Average income/inhabitant (2010) 
-Share young people.  Population 0-19 years compared to 
population 20-64 years (2011) 
-Share older people. Population 65+ compared to 
population 20-64 years (2011) 
- Personnel/1000 inhabitants (2011) 
- Belfius Cluster (15 dummies- ref.category cluster V12) 
 
V1= residential municipalities close to cities 
V2= residential municipalities in rural areas 
V3= rural municipalities –very rural with strongly ageing 
population 
V4=municipalities with concentration of economic 
activities-rural municipalities with industrial activity 
V5= regional municipality- medium-sized cities 
V6= conglomerate municipalities- little urbanized with 
strong demographic decline 
V7= conglomerate municipalities- strongly urbanized 
with low average income 
V8= municipalities with concentration of economic 
activities- cities and conglomerate municipalities with 
industrial activities 
V9= rural municipalities- small agricultural 
municipalities 
V10= residential municipalities-conglomerate 
municipalities with service industry 
V11= residential municipalities- residential municipalities 
close by cities with high incomes 
V12 rural municipalities- rural or urbanized agricultural 
municipalities with strong demographic growth 
(reference category) 
V13= municipalities with concentration of economic 
activities- urbanized agricultural municipalities with 
industrial activity and demographic growth 
V14= regional municipalities- regional cities 
V15= regional municipalities- large and regional cities 
V16= tourist municipalities- coastal municipalities 
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Table 5: Composition of subsidy computations 
Code A = Total recurrent and non-recurrent subsidies (excl. education subsidies)  
Code B = Total recurrent subsidies   
Code C = Non-recurrent subsidies  
Code D = Selection of 29 subsidy flows  
A B C D SUBSIDY 
 -  - Urban renewal projects (innovative and original projects) 
  -  Managers of diversity 
  - - Local centers for integration 
 -   Development of caravan parks 
  - - Compensation for particular loss of income (certain property 
taxes) 
  -  Agreements for aid developing 
  -  Touristic and recreational projects 
 -   Development of enterprise zones 
 -   House front renewal en renewal of disused commercial 
buildings 
- -   Building schools for compulsory and higher education 
-  - - Wages subsidies for education 
-  - - Operational subsidies for education 
-  - - Local flanking educational policy 
 -   Infrastructure for healthcare facilities 
 -   Care and support for young people 
 -   Local projects for children‟s poverty 
  -  Preventative family support 
  -  Child care (daycare) 
  - - Stimulation of local sport policy 
 -   Projects for sport initiatives and sport infrastructure plans 
  - - Local youth policy 
  -  Cultural heritage organizations 
  - - Local cultural policy 
  -  Art organizations  
  - - Regular employment programs 
  - - Specific employment of subsidized contractual workers 
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  - - Subsidies for centers for employment 
  - - Services for job-seekers 
 -   Action plans for diversity in employment participation 
 -   Small scale water purification 
  - - Program for development of rural areas 
 -   Support for prevention and selective waste handling 
  - - Agreements for environmental policy 
 -   Planning and development of land 
  -  Green sustainable jobs 
 -   Control of erosion 
 -   Mobility agreements 
 -   Bicycle infrastructure 
  - - Compensation for realization of register of unoccupied houses 
  -  Implementation and renewal of register of vacant parcels 
 -   Environmental structure planning 
 -   First register of building permits and plans 
 -   Public servants for urban development  
 -   Redevelopment of unoccupied or neglected manufacturing 
spaces 
 -   Social housing projects 
  - - Social renting agencies 
  - - Local housing policy 
43 26 21 29 TOTAL (the Vlabest inventory identified more subsidy flows but we only 
included the flows with complete data in our analyses) 
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14. End Notes
                                                        
1 We use the terms subsidies and grants in the same meaning. 
2 Vlabest „Vlaamse Adviesraad voor Bestuurszaken‟, Flemish Advisory Council for Administrative 
Affairs. 
3 An important conclusion of the distribution of grants to local governments is the „flypaper effect‟. It 
describes the effect that „the money sticks where it hits‟ meaning that more subsidies to local 
government are not translated into lower taxes for the constituents. Stated otherwise, 
intergovernmental grants stimulate more local government spending than increases in private income. 
4 Political localism in Flanders: this characteristic prevails when local governments dispose of a high 
level of direct access to the decision-making of its central counterpart see e.g., Wayenberg (2005). 
5 Due to the unavailability of adequate data we are not able to measure aspects of efficient working or 
„businesslike-working styles (which could be relevant in the process of obtaining subsidies). However, 
we incorporate the “Belfius clustering” a detailed clustering of municipalities comprising some 150 
socio-economic factors into our analysis (Belfius 2013). 
6 In some cases the effective payment occurs many years later. 
7 Subsidies to municipal autonomous agencies are also taken into account. 
8 Composition of expert panel: dean faculty of political and social sciences, president of official 
association of Flemish local governments and Vlabest coordinator.  
9 N= 295 and not 308 to enhance the comparability of our findings as non-recurrent subsidies were 
attributed to 295 municipalities. 
10 We did not opt for per capita computations as this would lead to important distortions in the data 
(e.g., the (fixed) subsidy for constructing a caravan camp in small versus large municipalities). 
11 We excluded the education subsidies in this computation because they bias the result due to the 
considerable amount of investment subsidies for building schools (attributed to selection of 
municipalities). 
12 For example national parties change names at local level to recruit more potential candidates. 
13 For reasons of completeness, we conducted additional linear regression analyses with interactions 
(e.g., between certain parties and certain influential subsidies but also with interaction of mayoral 
experience and party or membership of the Flemish parliament). The interactions were not significant.  
14 One exception is debt/inhabitant; significant at 10% level on first dependent variable. 
15 We computed various interactions with the variable personnel/1000 inhabitants, none was 
significant. 
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CONCLUSION 
Should we continue to be skeptic about local politicians‟ integration of modern government 
principles in their practices? This dissertation presents a nuanced picture of the impact of 
modernization reforms on politicians using original data and applying innovative research 
methods in the field of local financial management. 
Yes, on the one hand, there are arguments to confirm the skepticism about the effects of 
modernizing government on politicians‟ behavior. Without even considering the impact on 
politicians‟ conduct, we established a limited familiarity with NPM principles of party group 
leaders. Presumably this is also applicable to other groups of politicians or similar principles 
and instruments. The second study reveals restricted observable use of financial information 
in the budget debate. Mutatis mutandis, one could argue that this also holds for other types 
of information (e.g., performance information) or for other contexts of decision-making 
(strategic planning, for instance).  
These findings are important considerations for local governments. It means that in the 
decision-making processes, the political logic still prevails over the „modern‟ more 
businesslike NPM-inspired reasoning. Politicians‟ lack of interest for a more efficiency based 
decision-making seems a deep and complex issue. Our analyses showed that individual 
characteristics and contextual factors have only limited or at least scattered influence on 
politicians‟ behavior or on their familiarity with NPM. This means that other aspects could be 
at play, for example politicians‟ intrinsic lack of motivation for new ways of working and 
thinking. Some politicians such as opposition members and less experienced councilors could 
feel discouraged, because of the advantage of their opponents from the majority or the 
executive board.  
Beyond this question of personal motivation, we should ask ourselves if politicians can truly 
completely incorporate the new NPM principles in their range of thought. In this respect 
their preference for cash-based budgetary information over the new NPM driven accrual 
reporting is revealing. The implementation of businesslike accrual accounting has been a 
central element in many local financial management reforms, but our results about the 
observable use of information still show extremely limited usage of this information. 
Indeed, we should keep in mind that NPM-like decision-making might require a shift in 
values and a fundamentally different perspective. Politicians are representatives of the 
different opinions and perspectives in society and decide in the public interest. So, are the 
tensions between the political and the NPM-like rationales actually surmountable? Are we 
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able to identify favorable or unfavorable circumstances for politicians‟ incorporation of the 
NPM ideas? The evidence presented in this dissertation points at some conditions in 
politicians‟ work environment that could enhance their use of financial information or their 
familiarity with NPM. The third study showed that the internal political situation such as the 
relations between college members or the competition between the parties in council might 
be influential. In general the balance of power in the council and the local governments‟ size 
demonstrate the importance of the „local color‟, organizational and cultural factors that 
impact on politicians‟ behavior.  
Another factor concerns ideology. Overall, the impact of ideology on local government 
modernization is very limited, but we noticed that in some cases political parties made a 
difference. Municipalities with mayors belonging to a purely local party obtain less subsidies 
compared to mayors from the Christian Democrats. Party group leaders of the majority 
(often traditionally governing parties) are also more familiar with NPM principles. We thus 
have some evidence that political networks might positively contribute to dispersing the 
modernization principles and instruments among politicians. In this respect it could be 
relevant to conduct further research into the role of political parties in the reform of local 
government.  
Individual and socio-economic factors are also at play. The importance of personal 
characteristics such as experience, combining political mandates and financial expertise is 
demonstrated in the first study. Furthermore, some socio-economic and fiscal parameters 
influence politicians‟ behavior. Their impact is dispersed and difficult to interpret but in 
specific circumstances (e.g., in the occurrence of high municipal debt rate), they can impact 
on politicians‟ actions and their interest for businesslike information or methods. Finally, the 
studies demonstrate that organizational capacity, mostly measured by size and urbanization, 
has a clear positive impact on local governments‟ modernization. Councilors in larger 
municipalities are better informed and more familiar with modernizing government. Larger 
municipalities are better positioned to attract subsidies. Maybe their politicians face greater 
demands from the constituents or they can rely on a more extensive and professionalized 
administration?  
On the other hand, the three studies provide arguments to be more positive and nuanced. An 
example is mayors‟ entrepreneurial behavior. The mayors that we questioned about their role 
in the process of attracting subsidies were very concerned with the financial management of 
their municipality. NPM-associated principles such as accomplishing effectiveness and 
efficiency as goals of financial planning were often imbedded in their initiatives to obtain 
subsidies. In some municipalities mayors act as strategic initiators and public entrepreneurs. 
Another positive element to consider is that party group leaders are significantly more 
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familiar with visible, external managerial NPM principles. This suggests that visibility of new 
instruments might also positively affect politicians‟ interpretation, translation and 
assimilation of new instruments and styles. 
A final contribution of this dissertation is the attempt to make a quantitative assessment of 
politicians‟ internalization of „businesslike‟ thinking. In study 1 and 2 original measures and 
methods are developed. The NPM – familiarity coefficient provides an adequate 
measurement of familiarity with NPM principles. Future studies could apply the coefficient to 
other groups of politicians. Although the coefficient has sufficient internal validity for various 
aspects of the NPM repertoire, other elements could be added (e.g., aspects of marketization, 
contracting out, performance based pay, competitive tendering, …). Study 2 made a new 
evaluation of observable use of financial information. It demonstrates the potential of data 
collection in an action setting. It provides the opportunity to study the integration of ideas 
and information into practice. The same technique could be utilized to analyze the content of 
other debates in different political assemblies. 
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 IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE 
Although this dissertation is essentially academic, some interesting points for practitioners 
occurred during the research activities. They might be interesting to improve future 
initiatives concerning local government reform. A first point is that there are prominent 
individual differences between politicians. Some groups of politicians have a clear knowledge 
advantage over others. As we already discussed, there is a large discrepancy in familiarity 
with NPM-instruments between politicians in opposition and those in majority. Factors such 
as political and working experience are also at play. So reformers might consider more 
differentiation when addressing or informing councilors. 
As a matter of fact, Flemish local councilors‟ position is rather precarious compared to other 
countries (e.g., The Netherlands). It could be worth exploring if better working conditions 
would improve their performance in terms of effective and efficient political decision-
making. Being a member of council is more than a pastime. Whether it is a fulltime or part 
time occupation, it requires specific training and expertise. 
A second point is that there is no direct impact of legislation on politicians‟ behavior. 
Regardless of how much legislation is passed, without improving politicians‟ acceptance and 
knowledge of instruments and principles, there can be no genuine expectation that 
government reforms will be implemented properly. So this is a plea for less regulation and 
more efforts to create political support for modernizing local government. 
A third point is that larger cities and municipalities clearly lead on their smaller counterparts. 
When assessing the impact of context, size was often one of the most determinant factors. It 
would bring us too far to deepen the relationship between municipal scale and governance 
capacity, but we cannot overlook this finding. It demonstrates that beyond merely adopting 
and implementing innovative practices, scale and organizational capacity also influence 
politicians‟ behavior. This is something reformers could bear in mind when informing or 
sensitizing local policy makers. It might also be an element in the ongoing discussion about 
municipal amalgamations in Flanders or elsewhere. 
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 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Referring to Pollitt‟s classification of public management reform, this research mainly 
focused on the third stage, i.e. the changes in politicians‟ practices, behavior and observable 
actions. Recent studies have attempted to cover macro level results of NPM implementation, 
where the impact of using performance information and accounting innovations received 
most attention. However, the intended final outcomes of modernizing government are more 
far-reaching than those „instrumental‟ aspects. For example, what are the impacts of reforms 
on civil servants‟ behavior or more generally on local governments‟ performance ? How are 
the relations between politicians and administrators affected by new ways of working? 
Emerging issues are, for instance, whether more „businesslike‟ working by councilors is 
conceived as a threat by (top) civil servants? Another pertinent question is if the role of 
politicians in general could be undermined by this more „businesslike‟ style of decision-
making (as often advocated by the opponents of the reforms). This might be considered in a 
broader perspective taking into account the emergence of (semi)- autonomous local agencies. 
Besides these few points on which future research could shed light on, some other 
suggestions for research occurred during our activities. For example, we established that 
contextual factors in some cases have an impact on politicians‟ behavior but that their impact 
is dispersed and not clear-cut. This demonstrates that we should be cautious when discussing 
politicians‟ actual observable behavior based on previously identified factors in other 
research settings. Studying real behavior is a slippery project without many previous findings 
to fall back on. Deeper research into the determinants of behavior in governmental reform 
could enable us to refine existing theoretical frameworks and to identify more clearly those 
environmental conditions that can favor any process of change in local government. 
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